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EXECUTIVE	SUMMARY	
The world’s climate is changing, and companies around the world are irreversibly impacting 
societies and the environment. Regulators are increasingly turning to non-financial disclosure 
regulations as a tool to increase corporate transparency about social and environmental issues. 
The goal is to make companies accountable for their impact on their environment and to 
incentivize better corporate social and environmental performance. To achieve this, 
stakeholders need information on how well corporations perform on these issues. This study 
is aimed at finding out how transparent corporations are in disclosing quantitative 
performance measures. This is done in a Norwegian context, drawing a sample of companies 
affected by the 2013 amendment to the Norwegian Accounting Act. The amendment added 
requirements for non-financial disclosure for large companies in Norway. This study used a 
transparency framework to assess the transparency of annual reports from 2014. This revealed 
a varying degree of transparency on the different categories in the framework. Most 
importantly, this study found that transparency on environmental issues is alarmingly low. 
Secondly, it found that the specificity of the Accounting Act may play a role in the variability 
of transparency across different issues. Therefore, there is a need for more knowledge on how 
the regulators’ tools are affecting performance. 
Keywords: Transparency, CSR, Sustainability, Corporate Reporting, Non-financial 
Disclosure, Disclosure Regulation 
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1	INTRODUCTION	
The world is on a dangerous path. We are continuously emitting greenhouse gasses that are 
causing global warming (IPCC, 2014). This in turn is irreversibly impacting ecosystems and 
increasing the risk of extreme weather conditions such as droughts and cyclones. The 
emissions are largely driven by our economic activity and energy use to fuel our lifestyle and 
increase wealth and living standards (IPCC, 2014).  
While companies on one hand are providing jobs, goods and services our society demands, 
many companies on the other hand are further worsening the current environmental crisis. An 
important problem is that when information on companies’ environmental footprint1 is not 
available to customers, investors or society, then companies can exploit our largest common 
good with little or no consequences. In order to offset this information asymmetry, reporting 
requirements are implemented by governments around the globe (GRI, 2013). Systematic and 
transparent reporting can incentivize sustainable development because customers and 
investors may move spending and investments to more sustainable companies when such 
information is available (Pedersen & Døskeland, 2015), and because more transparent 
companies specifically attract large long-term oriented institutional investors (Eccles, Grant, 
& van Riel, 2006). 
In the last decade there has been a large growth in the number of sustainability initiatives 
globally (Kiron, Kruschwitz, Haanaes, & von Streng Velken, 2012). International reporting 
standards are being developed and national and transnational political processes are at work to 
revise the reporting requirements for companies. In the last few years there has been a large 
increase in the number of companies publishing non-financial reports or including non-
financial information in their annual reports (Ditlev-Simonsen, 2014), and today 93% of the 
largest 250 companies in the world report on their sustainability performance (GRI, 2015). 
Two of the most widely used reporting frameworks are the United Nations Global Compact 
and the Global Reporting Initiative (Ditlev-Simonsen, 2014). 
                                                
1 Such performance is variably referred to as “sustainability performance”, “CSR 
performance” or “ESG performance”. In this paper, the terms “sustainability”, 
“environmental, social and governance” (ESG), “non-financial” and “corporate social 
responsibility” (CSR) are used interchangeably, to describe reports with different degrees of 
focus on environmental, social and governance issues, or firms’ performance in these areas. 
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Political processes in the EU have resulted in several sustainability initiatives and in 2014 the 
EU Commission revised reporting requirements for the companies in the region (UNEP, GRI, 
KPMG and the Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa, 2013). The amended act requires 
non-financial reporting for the around 6000 companies listed on stock exchanges in the 
member states and the EFTA countries (Ditlev-Simonsen, 2014). Several countries have also 
amended their financial statements acts to require extensive non-financial reporting (UNEP, 
GRI, KPMG and the Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa, 2013). Norway added such 
requirements in 2013 (§3-3, 2013) affecting around 450 companies (Ditlev-Simonsen, 2014). 
The Norwegian Accounting Act § 3-3 c now requires large companies to report on how they 
integrate human rights, labor rights and social conditions, the environment, and anti-
corruption into their strategies and operations. One purpose of such requirement on non-
financial reporting is to increase companies’ transparency and provide information necessary 
for decision-making to stakeholders such as customers, investors, creditors and regulators 
(Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009). Another purpose is that it can work as an 
incentive to integrate environmental and social responsibility into companies’ strategies and 
governance (ibid.) (Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014). 
Earlier research have studied the effect of non-financial reporting legislation on stock market 
variables (Cheng, Ioannou & Serafeim, 2014), sustainability disclosure legislations’ effects on 
reporting volume and quality (Serafeim & Ioannou, 2014), and compliance with the specific 
requirements of the Norwegian legislation (Ruud, Ehrenclou & Gramstad, 2008; Olsen & 
Orderdalen, 2014). The research in the Norwegian context found varying efforts on 
sustainability reporting, and Olsen and Orderdalen (2014) noted that reports did generally not 
include comparable results from the companies’ sustainability efforts making it nearly 
impossible to assess their sustainability performance. The regulators in Norway do not 
prescribe the use of a specific non-financial reporting standard to ensure comparability 
between companies. Incomparable reports may limit the impact and usefulness of non-
financial reporting (Eccles, Serafeim, & Krzus, 2011) despite the reports being compliant to 
the law. To my knowledge, there is done little research on the comparability and transparency 
of non-financial reporting in a Norwegian context. 
1.1	Research	Question	
The purpose of this study is to explore how open or transparent Norwegian companies are on 
their ESG performance, thus analyzing a fundamental purpose of the requirement of non-
financial reporting in Norway. This is done by reviewing annual reports and annual non-
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financial reports from Norwegian corporations affected by the amendment put into effect in 
2013. This is important because the non-financial reports have not always fulfilled the 
requirements of the law (Olsen & Orderdalen, 2014; EY, 2014) and the information has not 
always been readily available or easily comparable for most stakeholders of the companies 
issuing these kinds of reports (Rea, 2015).  
One key issue is that the Norwegian Accounting Act does not require the use of a specific 
standard or framework (§3-3, 2013), thus giving reporting companies many different possible 
ways of how to write the reports. This means companies can almost freely decide what 
indicators to use, what level of detail to write, and whether or not to include quantitative and 
comparable performance results. The risk is therefore that the usefulness and comparability of 
the reports may be undermined by the decisions and interests of the reports’ authors (Langer, 
2006). By reviewing 25 non-financial reports and evaluating them from a transparency point 
of view, I will shed light on how well the reports fulfill the accounting law’s intention of 
providing “stock holders, customers and the society with better information on the company’s 
approach to CSR” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 83, author's translation). 
With this in mind I have formulated the following research question: 
“How	transparent	are	Norwegian	companies	about	their	CSR	performance	in	the	
annual	reports	for	the	accounting	year	2014”.	
Transparency in business is defined by Transparency International (2015) as making available 
information on rules, plans, processes and actions. It is generally held that transparent 
organizations’ actions and results should be visible so that the organizations can be held 
accountable for the actions being performed. In this paper, transparency is further narrowed 
down to include only quantitative and easily comparable information to better be able to 
distinguish between general non-descriptive statements and actual performance. 
The Norwegian Accounting Act § 3-3 c breaks down corporate responsibility into issues 
regarding human rights, labor rights and social conditions, the environment, and anti-
corruption. Frameworks such as the Global Reporting Initiative’s G4 and the principles of the 
UN Global Compact cover these issues and enable reporting companies to establish a 
standardized non-financial disclosure practice. With this in mind, I investigate the following 
sub-question to clarify the terms in the research question and to analyze transparency about 
CSR performance along four dimensions for which it is reasonable to expect companies to 
have quantitative data: 
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“How	much	quantitative	and	easily	comparable	information	is	publically	
disclosed	by	Norwegian	companies	about	their	corporate	governance,	labor	
conditions,	health	and	safety,	and	environmental	impact?”	
This is investigated by reviewing the non-financial reports or integrated annual reports of a 
sample of the companies affected by the Norwegian Accounting Act § 3-3 c. The law is 
applicable for large companies. It is estimated that the law affected roughly 450 companies 
from 2013. A sample of 25 companies is selected from this population. The reports are 
evaluated using a set of questions regarding each of the four dimensions it is expected that the 
companies should have quantitative and comparable data, and each report is given a 
transparency score on the basis of how many of the questions that the public reports can 
answer. 
This study is limited to public available reports for the accounting year of 2014, to reflect the 
information available to the companies’ stakeholders. I have not attempted to verify the 
accuracy or validity of the published information, since this would not reflect available 
information used by stakeholders in their decision-making. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 is devoted to presenting the 
conceptual framework of the paper. Chapter 3 outlines a short historical background for the 
development of international reporting frameworks and disclosure regulations. Chapter 4 
covers a review of recent literature analyzing the effects of disclosure regulation on 
transparency and performance. Chapter 5 outlines the methodology for the empirical research 
of this paper and discusses the relevance of the framework used. Chapter 6 presents the results 
of the study, and the findings are discussed in chapter 7. 
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2	CONCEPTUAL	FRAMEWORK	
The term “corporate sustainability” is defined by Soppe (2007) as “a company’s ability to 
create long-term value by taking risks and opportunities from the economic, environmental 
and social developments”.  
In this paper, the terms “sustainability”, “environmental, social and governance” (ESG), 
“non-financial” and “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) are used interchangeably, to 
describe reports with different degrees of focus on environmental, social and governance 
issues, or firms’ performance in these areas. term 
2.1	Corporate	Responsibility	
In this section I will discuss the conceptions of what corporate responsibility consists in, 
before outlining a broad definition of what responsibility means. The discussion leads to a 
framework of different levels or areas of responsibility for business. Because regulators want 
to increase performance and awareness through non-financial reporting regulations 
(Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2012), it is important to understand what types of 
responsibility regulators are aiming at. 
2.1.1	The	Scope	of	Corporate	Responsibility	
“Few	trends	could	so	thoroughly	undermine	the	foundations	of	our	free	society	as	
the	acceptance	by	corporate	officials	of	a	social	responsibility	other	than	to	make	
as	much	money	for	their	shareholders	as	possible.”	(Milton	Friedman,	1962	
quoted	in	(Morsing	&	Pruzan,	2007))	
When discussing the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR), it is only natural to 
begin with the well-known perspective of Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman. His shareholder 
perspective has dominated economic thinking for more than 40 years (Morsing & Pruzan, 
2007). In the article “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits” (1970), 
Friedman argues that the social responsibility of companies is best preserved through 
maximizing shareholder profit, while paying taxes to the government and letting them take 
responsibility for social issues. First and foremost, this is due to Friedman`s division of 
responsibility between the corporation and governments, which suggests social issues are best 
handled by governments while business should focus on business. Friedman argues that to 
maximize shareholder value, it is in the self-interest of managers to treat stakeholders and 
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customers well to create long-term customer loyalty. Attending to other objectives might then 
seem as an unnecessary distraction. 
The foremost critic of Friedman’s shareholder-centric perspective is Edward Freeman who in 
1984 published a stakeholder-centric response (Jørgensen & Pedersen, 2015). Freeman (1984) 
argued that companies have a fundamental responsibility for the stakeholders affected by the 
companies’ operations, in the same way companies should be held accountable for their 
stewardship of their shareholders’ capital. This perspective therefore incorporates externalities 
as a major factor when considering the limits of companies’ responsibility. While the 
shareholder perspective focuses on the legal power of the shareholder within the limits of the 
law, the stakeholder perspective increases the scope to also take responsibility for the negative 
effects of the companies’ operations on the social and environmental landscape. 
The consequences of the two perspectives becomes clearer in the cases where the interest of 
the firm would diverge from the interest of the company’s shareholders. A company’s 
interests lie in the long-term value it can create over its expected lifetime (ref. the definition 
of corporate sustainability in chapter 2.1), while Quarterly Earnings Calls in listed companies 
stresses short-term profits and growth in share price for the shareholders (Eccles & Serafeim, 
2013). Focusing only on maximizing shareholder value, will therefore not always result in 
managers creating long-term value. Short-term oriented managers undermine Friedman’s 
fundamental assumption mentioned above; that managers’ enlightened self-interest will lead 
them to work for long-term customer loyalty. 
2.1.2	What	is	responsibility?	
This and the following three sub-sections explores the fundamental definition of what 
responsibility is and discusses the difference between having and taking responsibility. This 
distinction is important for understanding the underlying assumptions in Freeman’s 
stakeholder perspective (see chapter 2.2.1) and provides a framework for later discussions. 
Having	responsibility	does	not	mean	that	you	take	responsibility	
According to the Oxford Dictionary of English (2013) responsibility is defined as a state of 
being accountable or to blame for something, and as the ability to take decisions. 
Responsibility can be divided into several types, depending on whether it is ex ante or ex post 
responsibility, whether it is direct or indirect, and the scope of the responsibility (Syse & 
Olsen, 2013).  
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Ex ante responsibility is a responsibility that is defined prior to the actions taken based on a 
person’s role. The responsibility can be defined through for example expectations, contracts 
and regulations. When something has happened and one is looking for who caused the event 
to happen, or when someone takes on the obligation to clean up, then we are looking for ex 
post responsibility.  
Secondly, responsibility can be divided depending on whether one actor causally made an 
event happen or if the actor was only partially contributing to it. This distinction can be quite 
controversial, because it questions what responsibility corporations should have for atrocities 
not directly caused by the company, but enabled by their operations. For example, should 
Norwegian companies operating in countries known for severe human-rights violations and 
large-scale corruption be held accountable for legitimizing or stimulating these violations?  
Thirdly, responsibility can be narrow or wide in scope. A narrow responsibility means that a 
company should only be held accountable to the shareholders as long as they stay within legal 
and contractual limits in the region of operation, a perspective promoted by Milton Friedman. 
A wide responsibility means extending the accountability to a wider specter of stakeholders, 
like in the stakeholder perspective of Freeman. 
This study focuses on the ex ante responsibility, that is the responsibility of companies by 
virtue of their role in society. 
2.1.3	Level	1	Responsibility:	Causal	Responsibility	
The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility is closely tied to the concept of externalities. 
Externalities are “indirect effects of consumption or production activity, that is, effects on 
agents other than the originator of such activity which do not work through the price system.” 
(Laffont, 2008). The problem of externalities is the foundation of the stakeholder perspective 
of Freeman (Jørgensen & Pedersen, 2015), and the problem becomes apparent when 
considering that companies’ use of common goods like the air or oceans (the natural 
environment) benefits the companies, but the costs are carried by society as a whole.  
In the current legal environment companies in many cases do not hold ex ante responsibility 
for pollution or other externalities from their operations. This is especially apparent when the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the White Paper Corporate Social Responsibility in 
a Global Economy (2009, s. 7) defines Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as what 
companies do on a voluntary basis to integrate social and environmental considerations into 
their operations. This means that companies in Norway are not held legally accountable for 
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the issues defined as “CSR-related”. On the other hand, this formulation makes very much 
sense when reviewing the term “license to operate”, a term that is much used when companies 
place responsibility on the political level that created the rules of the game (De Geer, 2007). If 
CSR was defined using a specific national legal framework, what responsibility would a 
multinational company then have when operating within a different country with a shaky 
legal and political framework? Ex ante social corporate responsibility is therefore not easily 
defined. 
Regardless of how legal frameworks define the ex ante responsibility of companies for their 
externalities, companies still hold ex post responsibility for the externalities because they 
caused them. This means that regardless of who are obliged to take responsibility to clean up 
the external effects of business, business has responsibility because they caused the effects. 
2.1.4	Level	2	Responsibility:	Society	and	Prerequisites	
An important question when defining corporate responsibility is the division of responsibility 
between the public and private domain (Morsing & Pruzan, 2007). This is one of the 
fundamental questions in the CSR literature (Jørgensen & Pedersen, 2015). There are likely 
many social, legal and political conditions that are prerequisites for companies to successfully 
develop profitable operations. Morsing and Pruzan (2007) asks the appropriate question; to 
what extent should companies contribute to create conditions they themselves benefit from? 
Corporate responsibility then becomes more complex as the company is treated less like a 
simple legal entity and more like a corporate citizen (ibid.). 
As corporations become increasingly global, the division of responsibility between private 
companies and the public institutions is challenged. Hans De Geer (2007) points out that there 
does not exist a global political power defining global legislation. Many companies operate in 
countries with weak social, political and/or legal structures, and have resources that exceeds 
the means of many of these countries. De Geer therefore argues that companies must do more 
than merely comply with the laws in these countries.  
De Geer’s view means that especially multinational corporations should contribute to the 
creation of societal conditions that benefit all companies, instead of exploiting the short-term 
opportunities found through the weak legal structures. Matten and Crane (2005) calls this kind 
of responsibility for corporate citizenship, were corporations work as providers, enablers, and 
channels of social rights. Corporate citizenship in practice involves corporations filling the 
gap where governments fail to provide or facilitate public services (ibid.). Matten and Crane 
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however, point to important concerns regarding who a corporate citizen should be held 
accountable to. Corporations are normally held accountable to their shareholders, and not to 
the public as the government they fill in for is. 
The moral reasoning for Hans De Geer’s position is excellently summarized in the World 
Commission on Environment and Development’s definition of sustainable development; 
“sustainable development meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.” (Quoted in (Tencati, 2007)). Exploitation of 
weak legal structures means that profit is gained by the company today without regard to the 
present or future generations in these areas. Such opportunism is therefore not compliant with 
sustainable development.  
An important perspective on this level of responsibility is the concept of Creating Shared 
Values (CSV) by Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer (2011). The CSV perspective is 
about recognizing that improved social conditions may have benefits for the company. Porter 
and Kramer illustrate their perspective by contrasting it to the concept of Fair Trade. A Fair 
Trade approach would reduce company profits (or increase the price to consumers) to offer 
local farmers higher prices for their crops, typically resulting in a 20-30% increase in their 
salaries. On the other hand, a CSV approach would be to invest in measures that increase the 
farmers’ efficiency, yield, product quality and sustainability, benefiting both the farmers and 
the firm. Instead of focusing on redistribution, a CSV investment “is about expanding the total 
pool of economic and social value” (Porter & Kramer, 2011, s. 5). 
2.1.5	Level	3	Responsibility:	Philanthropy	
In Jørgensen and Pedersen’s book Responsible and Profitable (2015), they present the view 
that companies can both shine light and casts shadow onto the social and environmental 
landscape. Shining light and casting shadows are used as metaphors for positive and negative 
externalities. While the metaphors are quite useful, the metaphor of shining light is limited in 
the sense that it makes no clear distinction between actions that affect a company’s 
operational efficiency and profitability by creating shared values, and actions of redistribution 
and philanthropy that only affect a company’s reputation and brand. This distinction is 
important because it seems to affect how corporations react to regulation and activism. 
Malaysian companies for example tend to perceive CSR activities only as philanthropic 
initiatives, and therefore overlook the opportunity to integrate responsibility initiatives into 
their core business model (Serafeim & Ioannou, 2014). 
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Jørgensen and Pedersen (2015) describes three continuums in CSR; motivation (extrinsic and 
intrinsic), integration (degree in which CSR affects core operations), and effect (degree of 
effect on profitability). Philanthropic initiatives are separated from Shared Value initiatives 
based on this continuum, where philanthropic initiatives do not affect the corporations’ core 
operations. Despite this separation, philanthropy may effect profitability by increasing brand 
recognition, improving employee morale and productivity, and overcoming regulatory 
obstacles (Smith, 1994). 
In sum, companies can take responsibility for something that they are not obliged to (ex ante 
responsibility), have not causally responsibility for (ex post responsibility), and that does not 
have a positive effect on their own core activities (CSV). In other words, we say that 
companies take responsibility when they do more than society could expect (Syse & Olsen, 
2013). A good example of this type of responsibility is the company TOMS, that donate a pair 
of shoes to children in need for each pair of shoes sold (TOMS Shoes, 2015). 
2.2	Transparent	Reporting	
Regardless of to what extent companies act responsibly or take on responsibility, they may 
still differ in the degree to which they are transparent on their social and environmental 
performance. This section therefore discusses what transparency means, and how systematic 
and transparent disclosure is one possible solution to the problem that those who are 
responsible (ex post/causal responsibility) does not take responsibility (ex ante responsibility). 
This section positions and focuses the study by giving an account for why transparency is an 
important tool for achieving better corporate responsibility performance. 
2.2.1	What	is	transparency?	
Transparency can be defined as “timely and reliable economic, social and political 
information, which is accessible to all relevant stakeholders” (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009), and has 
long been understood as synonymous to the idea of openness (Ball, 2009). 
There can also be several types of organizational transparency (Ball, 2009). Political 
transparency is openness on the goals and purpose of the organization. Economic 
transparency is openness on the technical factors involved in making a decision, for example 
the elements for calculating a credit score. Procedural transparency is openness on the 
procedures involved in a decision, for example the board’s voting procedures. Operational 
transparency is openness on performance. The empirical part of this study will focus mainly 
on operational transparency. 
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The definition of transparency is excellently summarized by Transparency International: 
“Transparency is about shedding light on rules, plans, processes and actions. It is knowing 
why, how, what, and how much.” (2015) 
2.2.2	What	are	the	Advantages	of	Transparency?		
Transparency ensures that business leaders and other decision-makers’ actions are visible and 
that others can hold them accountable (Transparency International, 2015). Legislation 
requiring more transparency make society’ expectations clear, and is an important tool to 
encourage socially and environmentally conscious practice (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2009). With clear lines of accountability, unacceptable practice becomes more 
difficult to justify (Bandura, Caprara, & Zsolnai, 2007).  
Increased transparency may lead to less moral disengagement from the acts done in the name 
of corporations and the stakeholders they affect, therefore encouraging more conscious 
practice (Bandura, Caprara, & Zsolnai, 2007). Transparency is therefore morally important 
because it enhances an attitude of honesty and commitment to truth (Dubbink, Graafland, & 
van Liedekerke, 2008), and can transform into more conscious behavior because clearly 
seeing the consequences of decisions made may evoke empathy (Bandura, Caprara, & 
Zsolnai, 2007). 
Allocative efficiency is enhanced by transparency because it enables customers to choose the 
products that is better on dimensions that are important to them, and it allows for companies 
to differentiate themselves from bad CSR performers (Dubbink, Graafland, & van 
Liedekerke, 2008).  
For business to flourish it is important to build trust and good relations with customers and 
other stakeholders. Transparency may be a way to show respect to stakeholders and is crucial 
when implementing initiatives that are aimed at improving reputation (Dubbink, Graafland, & 
van Liedekerke, 2008). When companies’ activities affect stakeholders’ interests, they should 
have a reasonable right to information (ibid.). Systematic and transparent reporting can 
therefore be an important tool for companies to build good stakeholder relations.  
2.2.3	What	are	the	Disadvantages	of	Transparency?	
Obtaining information may be costly and difficult for corporations. This may be especially 
true for CSR related information, because some aspects of CSR are difficult to measure 
(Dubbink, Graafland, & van Liedekerke, 2008). Several aspects, such as environmental 
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indicators, are easily quantifiable, but may still be difficult to obtain for many companies 
because measurement has not yet been standardized to the same degree as financial 
information has been. On the other hand, new technology is rapidly diminishing the cost of 
measurement (ibid.). 
Disclosure regulations mandating more transparency may backfire as the regulations in 
themselves can signal distrust (Dubbink, Graafland, & van Liedekerke, 2008). This signal can 
therefore promote an attitude of minimum compliance in corporations, creating resistance and 
distance between management and stakeholders.  
Transparent self-disclosure may be used as a “vaccine” against some of the negative effects of 
being targeted by NGO activism (Reimsbach & Rüdiger, 2013). From a risk perspective, this 
is an advantage as self-disclosure reduces the risk of being exposed by third-parties. From a 
responsibility perspective, this is negative because campaigns against perceived bad 
performers may not lead to necessary changes. 
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3	HISTORICAL	BACKGROUND	FOR	CORPORATE	SUSTAINABILITY	REPORTING	
This chapter will give a brief overview of the most important drivers for the growth in 
sustainability reporting; market-based, societal, political, regulatory and ethical drivers for 
non-financial disclosure (Vormedal & Ruud, 2009). Next, this chapter will describe two of the 
most important international non-financial reporting initiatives. The chapter concludes with a 
brief review of the political and regulatory drivers in Norway. 
3.1	Drivers	for	Non-Financial	Reporting	
Vormedal and Ruud (2009) explains that demand for non-financial information has increased 
with the growth in social responsible investment funds, creating market-based pressure on 
companies to disclose more information and for analysts to use such information. A major 
market-based driving factor in a Norwegian context has been the Government Pension Fund – 
Global with its ethical standards for companies in its portfolio (UNEP, GRI, KPMG and the 
Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa, 2013). 
Societal drivers stem from pressure from stakeholder groups (both internal and external) to 
make companies disclose information on how company operations affect the stakeholders’ 
interests. This driver is related to the rising arguments that effective stakeholder management 
increases firm performance, and that transparency helps improve reputation (ibid.).  
Politics and regulations have placed expectations on firms to become more transparent, 
especially through “soft-law” tools were companies are required to disclose information on 
how corporate responsibility is integrated into the company, or admit that it is not (ibid.). The 
establishment of international standard-setting organizations for non-financial reporting is 
relevant in this context, because these standards make non-financial reporting more useful and 
because they are referenced in the regulations (see Accounting Act § 3-3 c).  
Lastly, Vormedal and Ruud (2009) points to the ethical driver, as companies’ boards are 
gradually accepting the view that companies should be held accountable a wider range of 
stakeholders. 
3.2	International	Non-Financial	Reporting	Initiatives	
Initiatives for international non-financial reporting standards originated in the US and Europe 
during the 1960s and 1970s, driven by a renewed awareness of responsibilities that the 
governments were not able to fulfill (Serafeim & Ioannou, 2014). Two of the most well 
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known reporting initiatives, and the only two standards mentioned in the Norwegian 
Accounting Act (§3-3, 2013), are the UN Global Compact (UNGC) and the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI). Because reporting instruments that transcend national boundaries can 
improve the comparability of reports (UNEP, GRI, KPMG and the Centre for Corporate 
Governance in Africa, 2013), the two initiatives are discussed below. 
3.2.1	United	Nations	Global	Compact	(UNGC)	
In 1999 the UN initiated the Global Compact (UNGC) with the goal to create a sustainable 
and inclusive global economy (UNGC, 2015). The UNGC provides a normative framework to 
help companies shape their sustainability vision (UNEP, GRI, KPMG and the Centre for 
Corporate Governance in Africa, 2013). The idea is that companies align their operations to 
ten fundamental principles related to human rights, working conditions, the environment and 
anti-corruption (see Table 1).  
Today UNGC is the largest policy initiative for businesses committed to these principles 
(UNEP, GRI, KPMG and the Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa, 2013), with 8343 
supporting companies at the time of writing (UNGC, 2015). Companies supporting the UN 
Global Compact (“signatories”) must annually and publicly publish a Communication on 
Progress, and they recommend the use of the Global Reporting Initiative’s framework for 
these reports (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2012). Failing to publish Communications on 
Progress results in the companies’ status being changed to “non-communicating” and can 
Table	1	The	United	Nations	Global	Compact	Principles.	
Human	rights	
Principle	1:	Businesses	should	support	and	
respect	the	protection	of	internationally	
proclaimed	human	rights;	and	
Principle	2:	make	sure	that	they	are	not	
complicit	in	human	rights	abuses.	
Labor	
Principle	3:	Businesses	should	uphold	the	
freedom	of	association	and	the	effective	
recognition	of	the	right	to	collective	bargaining;	
Principle	4:	the	elimination	of	all	forms	of	
forced	and	compulsory	labor;	
Principle	5:	the	effective	abolition	of	child	
labor;	and	
Principle	6:	the	elimination	of	discrimination	in	
respect	of	employment	and	occupation.	
Environment	
Principle	7:	Businesses	should	support	a	
precautionary	approach	to	environmental	
challenges;	
Principle	8:	undertake	initiatives	to	promote	
greater	environmental	responsibility;	and	
	
Principle	9:	encourage	the	development	and	
diffusion	of	environmentally	friendly	
technologies.	
	
Anti-Corruption	
Principle	10:	Businesses	should	work	against	
corruption	in	all	its	forms,	including	extortion	
and	bribery.	
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eventually lead to expulsion from the list of signatories (UNEP, GRI, KPMG and the Centre 
for Corporate Governance in Africa, 2013). 
3.2.2	The	Global	Reporting	Initiative	(GRI)	
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) was formed in 1997 by the UN Environmental 
Program (UNEP) and several of its partners (Global Reporting Initiative, 2015) with the goal 
of developing a reporting standard for the “triple bottom line” (economic, environmental, and 
social performance) that would be on the same level as financial reporting (Serafeim & 
Ioannou, 2014). GRI has developed a framework of detailed reporting indicators to help 
reporters make valuable non-financial reports that matter to their key stakeholders (Global 
Reporting Initiative, 2013, s. 3). The idea behind GRI is that an internationally agreed upon 
framework for non-financial reporting will make abstract issues more tangible, enable non-
financial reports to be accessible and comparable to key stakeholders, and encourage 
transparency and consistency that is required to make information useful (Global Reporting 
Initiative, 2013). 
GRI launched their first version of the reporting standard in 2000, with the last iteration being 
released in 2013 which integrated the 10 UNGC Principles into the framework (Global 
Reporting Initiative, 2015). The framework is extensive with 150 indicators covering 
economic, environmental and social issues (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013). Companies 
using the framework are required to perform an analysis identifying the issues that are 
material to the company and its stakeholders, in order to reduce reporting volume and 
increase relevance. In addition, companies can choose to be in accordance with only the core 
indicators, or the comprehensive list of indicators. All companies using the reporting standard 
must transition to the latest version (G4) by 31.12.2015 (Global Reporting Initiative, 2015).  
3.3	Non-Financial	Disclosure	Regulation	in	Norway	
The Scandinavian private sector is widely recognized for high quality corporate reporting 
(Serafeim & Ioannou, 2014) and corporate responsibility (Vormedal & Ruud, 2009). Still, 
studies show major shortcomings in compliance to non-financial reporting requirements 
(Olsen & Orderdalen, 2014; Vormedal & Ruud, 2009; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2009; EY, 2014; 2015), as well as a lack of understanding of the concept of CSR and 
little knowledge of international non-financial reporting standards (Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2009). 
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The well-known White Paper Corporate Social Responsibility in a Global Economy by the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009) outlined global challenges and put CSR as a 
central tool for the international competitiveness of Norwegian companies. It discussed 
companies’ responsibility for the development of society in addition to traditional value 
creation. To develop and improve companies’ CSR practices the paper stated that systematic 
reporting was needed, but it was later acknowledged that it is difficult to find legal 
mechanisms that directly effects the business sector’s awareness (Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance, 2012). 
On the basis of the White Paper, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance proposed changes to the 
1998 Accounting Act to add a requirement for large companies to report on how they 
integrate respect for human rights, labor standards and working conditions, taking 
environmental concerns into account and combating corruption. The existing law before the 
proposal required reporting on issues related to working conditions and gender  
(non-)discrimination, and reporting on environmental issues was only required if the company 
had extensive impact on the environment (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2012). The 
changes to the Accounting Act was put into effect on 1. January 2013 (§3-3, 2013). 
One of the purposes of the broadening of the reporting requirements was that the committee 
claimed it should result in increased awareness and taking of social and environmental 
responsibility (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2012). To achieve this the committee noted 
that it was important that the reports includes more than just whether the companies have 
ethical guidelines or not. In essence the committee aimed at increasing openness in non-
financial reporting.  
Despite the regulator’s efforts to promote non-financial reporting, researchers claim that the 
government has failed to develop an adequate policy framework (Vormedal & Ruud, 2009) 
and that the regulations lack adequate guidelines for practical use (Olsen & Orderdalen, 
2014). 
The Norwegian law is made applicable for large companies according to the definition in the 
accounting law, covering public limited companies, listed companies, banks, financing 
companies and their parent companies. An exception is made for certain public companies. 
This resulted in around 450 companies being affected by the law in 2013. (Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance, 2012). 
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4	EXISTING	RESEARCH	
Several governments claim that increased transparency in and volume of non-financial 
disclosure will lead to better CSR related efforts (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2009), and that this will increase the companies’ competitiveness and performance (European 
Commission, 2014; Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 2011).  
This chapter will first explore the question; do such claims hold water? This is done by 
reviewing literature on several underlying questions; does CSR efforts increase corporate 
performance? Does reporting increase CSR efforts? And, does non-financial disclosure 
regulation improve reporting?  
Secondly, this chapter will give a brief overview of research on non-financial reporting 
practice in Norway. The existing research done on these questions lays the foundation for this 
study, by outlining a possible link between transparency in non-financial reporting and 
corporate performance, and by showing where more knowledge is needed in the Norwegian 
context. 
4.1	Does	CSR	Increase	Financial	Performance?	
Margolis and Walsh (2001) searched through thirty years of academic research to assess 
whether a positive link between social and financial performance exists. They found much 
research indicating a positive relationship, but raised methodological concerns regarding 
many of these studies. It is pointed out that few analyses give way for conclusions on 
causality, and the difficulty of finding valid measures of social performance is emphasized. 
Orlitzky et al. (2003) performed a quantitative and “more rigorous” (page 403) meta-analysis 
of 52 studies in this field. This was done in response to the research concluding that the 
evidence of a positive relationship between social and financial performance was too variable 
to draw general conclusions. The study found a positive correlation between social and 
financial performance, but also that mediating factors, such as reputation, were involved. 
Previous studies, including Margolis and Walsh (2001), were sharply rebutted by accounting 
a significant share of the variability in those studies to sampling and measurement errors. 
Carroll and Shabana (2010) also reviewed several of the many studies that have examined the 
relationship between CSR initiatives and firm performance. They found studies based on two 
different views of the relationships between CSR initiatives and firm performance; a narrow 
view looking for the direct links between CSR and financial performance (as in the Margolis 
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and Walsh study (2001)), such as direct cost savings or sales increases; and a broad view (as 
in the Orlitzky et al study (2003)) looking for both direct and indirect links between CSR 
initiatives and financial performance. The studies with the broader views found more positive 
relationships between CSR and firm performance through mediating variables, coming to the 
same conclusion as Orlitzky et al, that the important relationships between social or 
environmental and financial performance are not direct. As companies, stakeholder needs, and 
contexts are very different, it is naturally expected that CSR is approached very differently by 
companies, and that they in return reap very different results. According to the review, CSR 
have four different effects on firm performance, and these will be discussed in turn below. 
4.1.1	CSR’s	Four	Different	Mediating	Effects	on	Firm	Performance	
Some studies in the review by Carroll and Shabana (2010) found that CSR initiatives could 
reduce costs and risks for companies. Reduced operating costs could be obtained partly due to 
gaining tax benefits or avoiding strict regulations. Proactive engagement on environmental 
issues could also lower the cost of complying with new environmental regulations. Examples 
of lawsuits against firms with less than adequate standards in the value chains, showed that 
proactive engagement could reduce firm risk (ibid.). 
CSR initiatives could also strengthen firm legitimacy and reputation, by demonstrating that 
the firms could meet diverse stakeholder needs. This is argued to strengthen brand loyalty and 
attract investments. This argument is further enhanced by Eccles et. al. (2006), stating that for 
example through active communication about a company’s internal control system, a 
company can help establish and maintain a strong reputation. In one of the reviewed studies, 
consumers had explicitly claimed that their purchasing behavior had been influenced by CSR 
reputation of firms, showing the potential financial reward for firms (Carroll & Shabana, 
2010).  
Some firms may be able to build competitive advantage based on their CSR efforts, due to 
attracting more talented employees, gain customer loyalty, and obtaining better product 
differentiation (Carroll & Shabana, 2010). 
By reconciling the differing stakeholder demands and creating win-win situations would also 
benefit firms financially. This could either be through finding opportunities to profitably 
satisfy stakeholders’ demands, or by gaining support from stakeholders through its CSR 
initiatives that allows the firm to pursue new profitable ventures. An example of the latter was 
the Novo Group that gained support for its business involving genetic modification, while 
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Monsanto experienced great consumer resistance for its business in a similar field (Carroll & 
Shabana, 2010). 
The above meta-studies showed that finding valid measures for social performance may be 
difficult for researcher, which may help explain why managers find it difficult to explain the 
financial importance of sustainability issues or find useful information to back up such claims 
(Eccles & Serafeim, 2013). The latter two studies seem to agree that there exists a positive 
relationship between social and financial performance, but that the relationship is indirect. 
Later studies have further strengthened the above conclusion. Eccles, Ioannou and Serafeim 
(2014) found that companies that implemented sustainability policies (statistically) 
significantly outperformed companies without such policies in the long-term. Khan et al 
(2015) found that companies with higher performance ratings on material issues outperformed 
companies with lower ratings. They also found that companies with higher performance 
ratings on immaterial issues did not outperform the companies with lower ratings on those 
issues. 
4.2	Does	Reporting	on	CSR	Issues	Lead	to	Better	Performance	on	CSR	Issues?	
A performance-disclosure gap was found in one study (Font, Walmsley, Cogotti, McCombes, 
& Häusler, 2012), indicating that more reporting is not necessarily associated with better 
performance. On the other hand, this study only focused on the disclosure of policies and not 
on reporting of results or metrics. This can potentially conceal differences in management 
approach to CSR related issues.  
Another study (Eccles & Serafeim, 2013) focused on the reporting of policies and results in 
integrated annual reports, and found a positive relationship between reporting on 
environmental, social and governance issues and the score on indicators of quality of 
management on these issues. Other studies have also found positive associations between the 
level of voluntary sustainability disclosure and environmental performance (Clarkson, Li, 
Richardson, & Vasvari, 2008) and commitment to stakeholders (Michelon, 2011) 
4.3	Does	Non-Financial	Disclosure	Regulations	Improve	Reporting?	
4.3.1	Is	Disclosure	Volume	Increased?	
Studies of companies in China and South Africa have shown that regulations mandating 
disclosure of non-financial information increased the volume of non-financial information in 
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corporate reports (Serafeim & Ioannou, 2014). An important question then is; does increased 
volume of reports imply increased information quality? This question is not directly answered 
in the reviewed literature, but studies of the effects of non-financial disclosure regulation in 
Denmark suggest that increased volume was associated with increased reporting quality 
(Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 2013). Denmark also saw a significant, though expected 
increase in the number of first-time reporters on CSR-related issues. 43% of the reviewed 
companies published non-financial reports for the first time in the first year after the 
regulations (Neergaard & Pedersen, 2009). 
4.3.2	Are	Reports	Compliant	with	Regulations?	
A study of non-financial reporting in Norway before 2013 (Vormedal & Ruud, 2009) revealed 
that merely 10% of the reviewed companies complied with the regulations of non-financial 
reporting at the time. Studies of non-financial reporting in Denmark (Erhvervs- og 
Selskabsstyrelsen, 2013) following the new regulations on non-financial reporting, found that 
44% of the companies were compliant with the regulations. 97% of the reports in the Danish 
study included some information on the required issues, but all did not disclose information 
on each of the required dimensions. The staggering number of reports that were incompliant 
in both Norway and Denmark reveal important issues with the regulations themselves or with 
difficulties in the reporting process. 
The low rate of full compliance could be a symptom of a lack of an adequate policy 
framework for responsibility and reporting, that media and society has not been enough 
involved in public scrutiny, or that the regulators insufficiently monitor compliance 
(Vormedal & Ruud, 2009). 
4.3.3	Are	Reports	Using	International	Reporting	Frameworks?	
It is important to note the relevance of the absolute increase in number of reporters of non-
financial information in Denmark. If non-financial information is to be useful to investors and 
other stakeholders, it must first be available. Secondly, disclosed information must also be 
comparable if it should be widely useful (Rea, 2014) (Eccles & Serafeim, 2013). As reporting 
frameworks are still being developed and varying in use, legislation has proven to work as an 
important driver for demand for the frameworks (Global Reporting Initiative, 2015), creating 
a virtuous circle of demand, feedback, and development. 
Two of the four countries in the study by Serafeim and Ioannou (2014) did not see increases 
in reporting volume. These two countries did however already have a sizable non-financial 
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reporting volume before the regulations, and one of the countries had an upswing in adoption 
of international reporting guidelines while the other saw increased use of CSR related 
demands in the supply chain management. In the three consecutive studies in Denmark by 
Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen (2013) an increase in the number of signatories to the UN 
Global Compact and the use of GRI Reporting Guidelines was found. Still the numbers were 
relatively low, 20% were signatories to the UNGC and 25% used GRI in 2011. 
4.3.4	Is	Disclosure	Transparent	and	Comparable?	
Regarding the transparency of the reports, a good indicator would be if the reports included 
negative information about the firms’ performance. In the first year after the regulations in 
Denmark, no reports were found to include negative information, while 29% included such 
information two years later (Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 2013), indicating a substantial 
increase in disclosure transparency from the regulation. The researchers also noted in their 
analysis that 50% of the companies chose to be more transparent in 2010 than in 2009 
(Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 2011). It is possible that in an environment where all 
companies hide information, it would be very damaging for the first companies to disclose 
negative information. When regulation mandates all large companies to disclose non-financial 
information, such an environment might change, like the studies seem to reveal in Denmark.  
The three studies from Erhvervsstyrelsen (2013) showed that quantitative indicators were 
used by 38% of the reviewed companies in 2009, and this number did not increase in the 
subsequent two years after the regulations. On the other hand, the share of these companies 
using the GRI guidelines increased significantly. This shows a relatively low transparency on 
actual performance (low usage of quantitative indicators), but an increasing comparability of 
the information from those who disclose such information (high usage of standardized 
reporting framework amongst those who use quantitative indicators).  
4.4	What	Is	the	State	of	Non-Financial	Reporting	in	Norway?	
4.4.1	Disclosure	Volume	and	Quality	
A EY study (2014) found a substantial increase in the number of CSR reports in the first year 
(2013) after the non-financial disclosure regulations took effect in Norway compared to the 
year before. EY found a significant improvement from 2012 to 2013 in the reporting on 
guidelines, a good improvement in reporting on implementation and results, and only 
marginal improvements in reporting on ambitions and expectations for the future. They did 
not find any increase in reporting volume in 2014 (EY, 2015). A PwC study (2015) of the 100 
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largest companies in Norway found that the quality of the reports varied a great deal, with 65 
of the 100 companies being classified as low or mediocre on “reporting maturity” for the 
accounting year 2014. In sum, the three studies found a relatively low volume and quality of 
non-financial disclosure in Norway in and prior to 2014. 
4.4.2	Compliance	with	Regulations	
A study of non-financial reporting developments from 2012 to 2013 (Olsen & Orderdalen, 
2014) showed that only 16% (5 companies in the sample) were compliant with the new 
regulations. In addition, two of these companies fulfilled the requirements by stating that they 
did not have any guidelines on the five dimensions of the Accounting Act § 3-3 c: human 
rights, labor rights and social conditions, the environment, anti-corruption. The study also 
noted that the only three companies that were fully compliant with the new regulations 
(disclosed information on all dimensions), were also compliant in the year before the law took 
effect. These findings put the effects of the law into question, since the “good” reporters were 
already “good” before the regulations, and no other companies improved enough to comply 
with the new regulations in the first year. These findings support the findings of Vormedal 
and Ruud (2009) that found only 10% compliance rate before the new regulations. 
PwC (2015) noted in a similar study for the accounting year 2014  that 43 of the 100 sampled 
companies in their study were affected by the Accounting Act § 3-3 c, but as many as 15 
(35% of the affected companies) of them were completely lacking information on one or more 
of the categories required by the Act (human rights, labor rights and social conditions, the 
environment, anti-corruption). This means that at least 15% of the reviewed companies were 
not compliant with the regulations in 2014. In the EY (2015) study for the same year, 40% of 
the studied companies did not adequately report their guidelines on the four CSR dimensions 
in the law or how these were implemented, 46% did not adequately report results, and 60% 
did not report adequately on ambitions for future improvements. This result reveals that as 
many as 60% of the companies affected by the non-financial disclosure regulations may have 
not been compliant in 2014. 
Despite the depressing results on compliance from the studies discussed above, the assurance 
statements attached to the reports still claimed that the reports were compliant (Olsen & 
Orderdalen, 2014). 
Vormedal and Ruud (2009) point out that the Norwegian government has not further 
developed the disclosure requirements with an adequate policy framework or practical 
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guidance, and also lack in compliance monitoring. This fact is in contrast with Danish 
government’s quick publication of explanations and guidelines for their corresponding 
regulation (Olsen & Orderdalen, 2014), and gradually increasing compliance (Erhvervs- og 
Selskabsstyrelsen, 2013). 
4.4.3	Disclosure	Transparency	and	Comparability	
PwC (2015) found that 51% referenced the GRI Guidelines, and also found that 44% of the 
companies had quantitative goals and KPIs, but it is unclear how many of these companies 
disclosed any of these quantitative results. Olsen and Orderdalen (2014) found that several 
companies in their sample were using standard phrases stating that the company did have 
guidelines for caring for the environment, and that they were integrated into all parts of the 
organization, but that later failed to describe how the guidelines were implemented and 
results. Only half the companies that stated that they had guidelines for the four categories 
included information on how these guidelines were implemented and results from this. In 
sum, there seems to be ample room for improvement on transparency in general and on 
quantitative indicators in particular. 
 
	 29	
5	METHODOLOGY	
This chapter covers the methodological choices made in the study. In the first section, I will 
lay out the research design used in the study. Thereafter, I will discuss the sampling procedure 
used when choosing which companies to analyze. Third, I will discuss the data sources used. 
Finally, I will discuss the process and rules used for quantification of the data sources. 
5.1		Research	Design	
5.1.1	Design	choices	
According to Ghauri & Grønhaug (2010, s. 56) research problems have different levels of 
structure depending on how well the problem is understood and the amount of flexibility the 
researcher needs in order to find an answer. While earlier research have indicated that finding 
valid measures for ESG performance is difficult (Margolis & Walsh, 2001), newer research 
have found that this is improving (Khan, Serafeim, & Yoon, 2015). Therefore, this study can 
take a more structured approach to the research problem using a variables from earlier 
research, and it may be appropriate with a descriptive research design (Grønhaug & Ghauri, 
2010, s. 56).  
This study will analyze written reports which mostly consists of qualitative textual data, as 
well as some quantitative data. The focus will be on a qualitative review of data in its natural 
context, and apply the transparency framework to give a score on how well each category and 
concept in the framework is covered in each of the non-financial reports.  
By reviewing several non-financial reports and evaluating them from a transparency point of 
view, it might be revealed how well the reports fulfill the accounting law’s intention of 
providing “stock holders, customers and the society with better information on the company’s 
approach to CSR” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 83, author's translation) 
The analytical process must handle the data in such a way that it is possible to draw 
conclusions (Grønhaug & Ghauri, 2010). In this study, the purpose is not to develop new 
categories, but rather applying existing categories to the data. It is therefore important to 
create and follow specific procedures and rules when performing the review (Grønhaug & 
Ghauri, 2010). For each category the responses in the reports are given a score to 
dimensionalize and give more meaning to the use of the categories (Grønhaug & Ghauri, 
2010). This may also help identify how far the reports have to go in order to be sufficiently 
transparent. 
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5.1.2	Limits	of	design	
Because this study uses a cross-sectional design it is only capable of giving a snapshot or the 
status quo of a few large companies’ reports. This limits the scope of conclusions that will be 
possible to draw based on the results. On the other hand, the study may have the potential to 
reveal to stakeholders the state of reporting of some of the largest companies in Norway. In 
this way, the study might provide insights on how much relevant and comparable information 
the companies provide to their shareholders, society and other stakeholders, compared to the 
other companies in the sample. By comparing the non-financial reports, it is also possible to 
get an indication of what information is left out. 
This study will use a set of indicators based on an existing transparency index (Sustainability 
Data Transparency Index - SDTI (Rea, 2015)). By doing this, the study is relying on the 
validity and reliability of the concepts, factors and measures in the existing SDTI index. The 
SDTI has been peer-reviewed by industry actors and experts in South Africa (Rea, 2015), and 
I have therefore not attempted to reassess the SDTI’s validity claims. The current author 
acknowledges that future analyses invalidating certain aspects of the SDTI would undermine 
some of the theoretical foundation for this study. 
5.1.3	Challenges:	Objectivity,	reliability	and	validity	
To achieve a high level of objectivity in this study, I will try to avoid a more subjective 
scoring system. If I for example would give scores based on the underlying performance 
stated in the reports, I would not only risk being influenced by existing impressions of the 
companies, but would also give significant room for disagreement on the criteria for the 
scoring system. Comparison on the basis of “raw ratio scale data” (i.e. emissions of CO2 
equivalents in absolute tons) can also be problematic, even though many reports contain such 
data and it allows for advanced statistical analysis (Grønhaug & Ghauri, 2010). The main 
issue is connected to what standard of comparison to use, and how to score a company’s 
emissions in relation to other companies. It is expected that CO2 emissions would vary 
depending a number of factors, including company size, industry, and efficiency.  
Trying to establish a common standard of comparison for all indicators in the framework 
would not be suitable within the limits of a master thesis. Therefore, the study will be focused 
on whether or not easily comparable information is present in the reports, rather than 
evaluating the underlying performance. Evaluating the underlying performance would 
significantly increase the scope of the research, and therefore drastically reduce the possible 
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size of the sample and eliminating the usefulness of this report. The more “objective” way of 
scoring the information is intended to reduce the threat to internal validity caused by 
subjective researcher bias, increasing confidence that the results given are indeed true 
(Grønhaug & Ghauri, 2010).  
5.2	Research	sample	
From 2013 around 450 large companies in Norway have been required to publish a non-
financial report (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2012). These reports must be sent to The 
Accounting Registry [Regnskapsregisteret] within one month of approval (§ 8-2 first section). 
The service Proff Forvalt (www.proff.no) provided a list the population of companies that fit 
the criteria of the law, and the public annual reports was found on the investor information 
pages of the sampled companies. 
Since the population consists of around 450 companies, a review of a sample of 25 companies 
(>5% of the population) would be considered sufficient to be able to find characteristics 
regarding the population. This sample size would also be suitable in the master thesis format, 
given the time and resource constraints. 
The method used to draw the sample from the population is called “systematic sampling” 
(Grønhaug & Ghauri, 2010). The aim is to draw a sample that is representative for the whole 
population, and this is done by sorting the population of companies by operating revenue and 
choosing every 18th company in the list to get a sample of 25. A successful sample draw 
should have a sufficient spread in operating revenue and represent as many of the 
population’s industries as possible. 
The sample is shown in Table 2 below. An asterisk (*) represent companies traded out of the 
sample for various reasons; # 1 Aker Contracting was traded because the company is a 
subsidiary of #17 Ocean Yield. #5 Cellcura was recently acquired and the annual report for 
2014 was not made available at the time of data collection. #26 Voss of Norway did not have 
a publically available annual report for 2014 at the time of data collection.  
A double asterisk (**) represent companies replacing the companies marked with a single 
asterisk (*). The companies removed from the sample were replaced by companies beneath 
them in the population list when sorted by company revenue. 
Table 3 presents an overview of the industries represented in the sample, as well as the 
number of companies drawn from each industry. Since the intention of the sample drawing 
method was to get a fairly representative sample, a successful sample would represent as 
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many industries as possible, and each industry would be represented by few companies (low 
clustering). 
Table	2	Sample	with	identifier	and	name	of	companies.	
	 #	 Identifier	 Name	 Operating	Revenue	
*	 1	 989061879	 AKER	CONTRACTING	FP	ASA	 116	565	
	 2	 886582412	 AQUA	BIO	TECHNOLOGY	ASA	 22	461	
	 3	 914864445	 BN	BANK	ASA	 647	000	
	 4	 974442167	 BOUVET	ASA	 1	132	598	
*	 5	 980040461	 CELLCURA	ASA	 4	356	
	 6	 921526121	 DNO	ASA	 3	916	218	
	 7	 997639588	 EUROPRIS	ASA	 4	258	837	
	 8	 934382404	 EVRY	ASA	 12	773	000	
	 9	 982985110	 FISH	POOL	ASA	 12	992	
	 10	 987974532	 GC	RIEBER	SHIPPING	ASA	 881	568	
	 11	 995568217	 GJENSIDIGE	FORSIKRING	ASA	 23	098	700	
	 12	 988247006	 INTEROIL	EXPLORATION	AND	PRODUCTION	ASA	 358	213	
	 13	 976605713	 KITRON	ASA	 1	751	300	
	 14	 966011726	 NORDIC	SEMICONDUCTOR	ASA	 1	447	173	
**	 15	 891797702	 NORTH	ENERGY	ASA	 3	493	
	 16	 864234232	 NORWAY	ROYAL	SALMON	ASA	 2	599	799	
	 17	 991844562	 OCEAN	YIELD	ASA	 249	300	
	 18	 994051067	 PANORO	ENERGY	ASA	 0	
	 19	 916235291	 PETROLEUM	GEO-SERVICES	ASA	 1	454	000	
	 20	 915929265	 Skiens	Aktiemølle	ASA	 1	164	
**	 21	 981363876	 STATOIL	KAPITALFORVALTNING	ASA	 114	685	
	 22	 916300484	 STOREBRAND	ASA	 63	669	000	
	 23	 996162095	 TARGOVAX	ASA	 72	
	 24	 916819927	 TORGHATTEN	ASA	 8	187	448	
	 25	 986144706	 VERDIBANKEN	ASA	 34	718	
*	 26	 980067645	 VOSS	OF	NORWAY	ASA	 336	888	
	 27	 817244742	 Voss	Veksel-	og	Landmandsbank	ASA	 93	225	
**	 28	 981953134	 ZALARIS	ASA	 326	145	
Table	3	Distribution	of	companies	in	sample	across	industries	
	
Industry	 Companies	in	
Sample	
Office	administrative,	office	support	and	other	business	support	activities	 1	
Electricity,	gas,	steam	and	hot	water	supply.	 1	
Wholesale	trade	(not	motor	vehicles)	 2	
Financial	Service	Activities	 4	
Insurance	 1	
Research	and	Development	 2	
Activities	of	head	office	and	management	consultancy	 1	
Real	Estate	activities	 1	
Manufacture	of	computer,	electronic	and	optical	products	 2	
Manufacture	of	food	products	 1	
Technical	testing	and	analysis	 1	
Administration	of	financial	markets	 2	
Computer	programming,	consultancy	and	related	activities	 2	
Extraction	of	crude	petroleum	and	natural	gas	 2	
Transporting	and	storage	 2	
Total	 25	
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5.3		Data	Sources	
According to the accounting law § 3-3 c section five, the report on ESG must be published as 
a part of the annual report or as a separate report publically available. According to the 
Accounting Act § 3-1 section one, the report must be approved within six months after the 
fiscal year ended, and according to § 8-2 section one, the report must be sent to The 
Accounting Registry no later than one month after approval. 
5.3.1		Annual	reports	for	the	accounting	year	of	2014	
The data sources consist of annual reports and related publications from the sampled 
companies for the accounting year of 2014 (latest available reports). This could be in the form 
of integrated or independent sustainability reports with or without reference to the GRI 
Guidelines or progress reports for members of the UN Global Compact. The reports were 
downloaded from the webpages of the sampled companies, organized in Evernote and 
reviewed in its original format. Notes were taken directly on the reports and the scores 
recorded in a score chart using Microsoft Excel. 
5.3.2		Limited	to	public	information	
This study is limited to the use of annual reports and related non-financial reports publically 
available, in order to study the same information that is available to other company 
stakeholders. One of the purposes of the new regulations in Norway is that stakeholders could 
become better informed about ESG issues (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009). 
Even though it could be interesting to try to expose companies’ reporting errors or highlight 
unreported activities, it was not in the scope of this research to perform interviews or gather 
other forms data to confirm the accuracy of the information in the reports. 
5.3.3		Challenges	with	secondary	information	
One of the advantages with using secondary information like public reports, is that it is much 
more easily available than primary data. This availability may make larger samples possible 
and therefore pave the way for better understanding of the subject (Grønhaug & Ghauri, 2010, 
s. 94). 
One of the disadvantages with secondary information is that the information is gathered for 
another purpose than this research report. This means that the sources will contain much 
information that does not fit with the research purpose of this paper, and it therefore puts a 
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demand on the researcher to find out what information is necessary to answer the research 
problem. This also means that the sources may contain management’s wishful thinking and 
biased information meant to put the company in a better light (Grønhaug & Ghauri, 2010, pp. 
96-97). This is an important issue, since the lack of mandatory non-financial standards in the 
Norwegian accounting law creates a hypothetical possibility for manipulation or distortion of 
information. 
Because this study will not perform a subjective assessment of the quality of the information 
given in the reports, but will only focus on the presence of quantitative and comparable 
information, this study will be less affected by biased information. All indicators used in this 
study are based on the existing SDTI index, with most of the indicators found in the SDTI 
being quantitative counterparts to standard disclosures found in global recognized frameworks 
like the GRI (Rea, 2015). With the new requirements in Norway and the law’s reference to 
the GRI framework, it is reasonable to expect companies to publish information on most of 
the indicators in the study. 
5.3.4		Is	the	information	in	the	data	sources	valid?	
The data sources are public reports published by companies required to do so by law, and are 
made with the purpose of giving stakeholders and shareholders decision critical information 
(Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009). It would therefore be reasonable to expect 
companies to truthfully fulfill the requirements of the law and provide information asked for 
by the companies’ stockholders and other stakeholders.  
On the other hand, some have criticized the law since it requires companies to report on issues 
that for now are mostly voluntary to the company (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2012). 
One can thus speculate whether or not this law will ensure that the reports’ content is factual 
and valid. Although history has shown us reporting scandals tied to obligatory financial 
reports (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005), it is not necessarily reasonable to therefore assume that 
most reports are false or distorted.  
Will assurance be a remedy to this issue? Research has shown that assured sustainability 
reports may have a very varying degree of compliance to and correct use of the referenced 
framework (Rea, 2013, 2014), and others have found much use of standard phrases with little 
information value (Olsen & Orderdalen, 2014). One should therefore be cautious when 
interpreting and comparing the information given in companies’ non-financial reports. This 
issue highlights the importance of research that assesses transparency, information quality, 
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and information validity of such reports. While this study focuses on transparency and might 
be able to show what quantitative information is left out of the reports, it is not in the scope of 
this research to assess the validity of the claims in the reports.  
5.4	Quantifying	the	data	
After collecting all the annual reports and the related non-financial reports I was left with 
huge amounts of data to be analyzed. The purpose was to analyze how transparent each report 
was by assessing what aspects of the transparency framework was covered in the reports. To 
do this, a set of rules was developed on the basis of the earlier research done using the 
Sustainability Data Transparency Index framework (Rea, 2015). The set of rules can be found 
in Appendix I. Then these rules were used to evaluate each non-financial report or integrated 
annual report. The results from this review was recorded in a spreadsheet using Microsoft 
Excel, and is presented in full in Appendix III.  
 
Figure 1 Example of scoring from the score chart. The full chart is presented in Appendix IV. 
5.4.1	Advantages	of	basing	the	study	on	an	existing	framework	
By using an established and informally peer-reviewed (Rea, 2014, 2015) framework for 
scoring, this study can adopt verified conceptual definitions of what aspects of the reports to 
be measured and rules for how to give numbers to the properties of these aspects (Grønhaug 
& Ghauri, 2010). By following rules specifying how to apply numbers to the indicators in the 
framework, it is easy for other researchers to verify the reliability and results of this study. 
By performing a study using a framework based on the existing SDTI framework, this study 
might provide the authors of the framework with knowledge on the framework’s usefulness in 
and transferability to another region. It will also be possible to benchmark the sample reports 
to reports from the same industry in another region, further increasing the usefulness of the 
framework itself.  
	36	
5.4.2	Specifying	rules	
The set of rules was defined based on the previous research of Rea (2014, 2015), adapted to 
the Norwegian context. The rules define how to apply a score to a specific dimension in the 
framework, thus scoring if information on a specific subject is provided to the reader in a 
quantitative and comparable format. The categories of indicators used in this study consist of 
economic, governance, labor, health and safety, and environmental indicators in addition to 
standards (See Appendix I for overview of the indicators). 
Within each category there are a number of indicators which measure different aspects of the 
categories mentioned above. Each indicator must be scores in a mutually exclusive way in 
order for the information to fit into a single category (Grønhaug & Ghauri, 2010, s. 151). To 
achieve this, each of these indicators are scored using a three-point scale to divide the 
information according to how well the indicators were quantitatively covered: 
• 0	of	2	is	given	when	no	quantitative	information	could	be	found	regarding	the	
indicator.	This	means	that	sections	with	verbal	descriptions	of	the	aspect,	but	with	no	
identifiable	quantitative	result	to	assess	actual	performance	is	given	this	score.	
• 1	of	2	is	given	when	the	indicator	is	partly	covered	in	the	report.	This	includes	
incidents	where	information	needs	to	be	calculated,	estimated	or	found	outside	the	
reports	or	attached	documentation	referenced	in	the	reports,	as	well	as	incident	
where	the	information	is	clearly	incorrect	(obvious	rounding	errors	or	too	many	
zeroes).	
• 2	of	2	is	given	when	the	indicator	is	reasonably	covered.	This	means	that	quantitative	
information	is	provided,	it	is	easily	located	within	the	report	or	attached	
documentation,	and	it	is	not	clearly	incorrect.	
See the Appendix I for the full list of indicators. 
5.4.3		Analysis	of	the	reports	
After the rules was specified, a preliminary reading of the report was done to identify relevant 
sections of the reports, and to find external documentation if relevant. The rules were then 
used to analyze the non-financial reports and integrated reports, including attached 
documentation referenced to in some of the reports.  
Each report and external documentation was organized in Evernote, where each company was 
given a unique ID number and filed in separate notes. All relevant information in the reports 
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was highlighted directly in each document and notes or comments stored in each company 
note. The scores were recorded in a spreadsheet developed in Microsoft Excel where each 
company’s report transferred to one row in the spreadsheet, and all properties of the company 
and the report as well as all scores to each indicator were transferred to separate columns. 
Some additional properties were also recorded: number of employees; operating revenue; 
where the information was found, whether in a separate non-financial report, integrated 
report, and/or in external documentation; and if the report was externally assured. 
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6	FINDINGS	
This chapter is dedicated to give an account of the results from the empirical data collection in 
the study. First, I will give a brief overview of characteristics of the sample to give the 
empirical results some context. Consequently, results from each category of questions in the 
transparency index is presented. 
6.1	About	the	sample	
The sample represents a wide range of industries in Norway. The sample was drawn to 
represent a fairly representative cross section of the population of large companies registered 
in Norway, spanning 16 different industries and drawing between 1 and 4 companies in each 
industry (see Table 3 in Chapter 5.2). The companies in the sample reported employing 
between 1 and more than 10.000 people in Norway and abroad (see Figure 3), as well as 
having a reported revenue of between 0 and 63bn NOK in 2014 (see Figure 2). In total, the 
sample represented a diverse cross-section of the Norwegian market. 
The reviewed reports ranged from 14 to 
197 pages in length (see Figure 4), 
dedicating between 0-20% of the space 
to sustainability reporting. The average 
report was 84 pages long devoting 4% 
of the space to CSR disclosure – 
including figures and imagery. In many 
cases design elements or non-relevant 
illustrations or images occupied large 
portions of the allotted space (see 
example in Figure 2).  
The majority of the reports in the sample had a primarily descriptive or qualitative approach 
to sustainability disclosure, emphasizing general policies and the companies’ values, or 
Figure	2	Example	of	CSR	disclosure	from	the	annual	report	of	Evry	ASA 
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referred to the companies’ Code of Conduct. See 
Figure 4 for an example of environmental 
disclosure from one of the reports. This was in 
contrast to the same companies’ clear focus on 
comparability and quantification on economic disclosure, which is exemplified in Figure 3. 
There were, however, some notable exceptions. Two reports (8%) used the Global Reporting 
Initiative reporting framework, and a few other reports had a strong emphasis on comparable 
quantitative results. Three companies (12%) did not include any CSR related information in 
the annual report or related documentation, while 9 companies (36%) dedicated a half page or 
less to CSR disclosure (0,6% of the total report length). 6 companies (28%) dedicated more 
than the average of 4% of the pages to CSR, with a significant dedication gap between the top 
three reports and the rest (4th largest dedication to CSR disclosure at 4,57% and the 3rd largest 
at 11,57% of the report space – more than 2,5 times the share). See figure 4 for illustration of 
all these numbers. 
 
Figure	4	Image	from	the	annual	report	of	Zalaris	ASA,	page	7:	
presenting	economic	results	with	comparison	to	previous	years. 
Figure	3	Image	from	the	annual	report	of	Zalaris	ASA,	
page	28:	The	Boards	report	on	Corporate	Social	
Responsibility. 
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Table	4	Overview	of	the	sample,	with	number	of	employees	at	year's	end,	and	operating	revenue	in	1000	NOK.	
#	 Identifier	 Name	 Legal	
Form	
Employees	 Revenue	
(1000	NOK)	
2	 886582412	 AQUA	BIO	TECHNOLOGY	ASA	 ASA	 5	 22	461	
3	 914864445	 BN	BANK	ASA	 ASA	 126	 647	000	
4	 974442167	 BOUVET	ASA	 ASA	 1008	 1	132	598	
6	 921526121	 DNO	ASA	 ASA	 1107	 3	916	218	
7	 997639588	 EUROPRIS	ASA	 ASA	 1895	 4	258	837	
8	 934382404	 EVRY	ASA	 ASA	 10350	 12	773	000	
9	 982985110	 FISH	POOL	ASA	 ASA	 5	 12	992	
10	 987974532	 GC	RIEBER	SHIPPING	ASA	 ASA	 99	 881	568	
11	 995568217	 GJENSIDIGE	FORSIKRING	ASA	 ASA	 3525	 23	098	700	
12	 988247006	 INTEROIL	EXPLORATION	AND	PRODUCTION	ASA	 ASA	 102	 358	213	
13	 976605713	 KITRON	ASA	 ASA	 1176	 1	751	300	
14	 966011726	 NORDIC	SEMICONDUCTOR	ASA	 ASA	 273	 1	447	173	
15	 891797702	 NORTH	ENERGY	ASA	 ASA	 40,4	 3	493	
16	 864234232	 NORWAY	ROYAL	SALMON	ASA	 ASA	 129	 2	599	799	
17	 991844562	 OCEAN	YIELD	ASA	 ASA	 18	 249	300	
18	 994051067	 PANORO	ENERGY	ASA	 ASA	 7	 0	
19	 916235291	 PETROLEUM	GEO-SERVICES	ASA	 ASA	 2301	 1	454	000	
20	 915929265	 Skiens	Aktiemølle	ASA	 ASA	 1	 1	164	
21	 981363876	 STATOIL	KAPITALFORVALTNING	ASA	 ASA	 13	 114	685	
22	 916300484	 STOREBRAND	ASA	 ASA	 2232	 63	669	000	
23	 996162095	 TARGOVAX	ASA	 ASA	 6	 72	
24	 916819927	 TORGHATTEN	ASA	 ASA	 4618	 8	187	448	
25	 986144706	 VERDIBANKEN	ASA	 ASA	 13	 34	718	
27	 817244742	 Voss	Veksel-	og	Landmandsbank	ASA	 ASA	 21,8	 93	225	
28	 981953134	 ZALARIS	ASA	 ASA	 411	 326	145	
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Figure	5	Overview	of	the	sample	by	operating	revenue 
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Figure	7	Overview	of	sample	by	employee	count 
Figure	6	Overview	of	annual	report	length	and	share	of	report	devoted	to	CSR	reporting.	Companies	are	sorted	
by	number	of	pages	on	CSR. 
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6.2	Standard	Disclosures	
The dimension called Standard Disclosures reflects the use of the GRI and UN Global 
Compact frameworks, assurance of the sustainability disclosures, and whether or not there 
were given information on what and how data points were tested by the auditor. 
The distribution of the companies’ total scores in the Standard Disclosures category is shown 
in Figure 8. Of the reviewed companies, only Storebrand ASA were awarded a 100% score on 
this dimension. One company achieved a 75% score, 2 scored 50%, 11 scored 25%, and 10 
companies scored 0%. Of the 10 companies with a 0% score, half were from the service or 
finance industry. These 10 companies dedicated on average 1.08% of their annual reports to 
CSR disclosure (see Figure 4). 
The distribution of scores on the individual indicators in the Standard Disclosures category is 
shown in Figure 9. It shows that only 2 companies (8%) stated that they used the GRI 
reporting framework (question 1). 15 (60%) of the companies had their non-financial reports 
assured by an independent auditor (question 2), and of these only one company (appr. 6%) 
had the auditor provide specify the assurance procedure (question 3). 4 (16%) companies 
stated they were signatories to the UN Global Compact. 
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Figure	8	Overview	of	sample	sorted	by	transparency	score	on	the	category	Standard	Disclosures.	
 
 
Figure	9	Distribution	of	scores	from	the	25	companies	on	the	Standards	Indicators.	
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6.3	Governance	
The dimension called Governance captured information on the board, management and 
auditors. More specifically, it looked for information on number of board members and 
managers, attendance at meetings, gender diversity, age spread, and length of service, as well 
as auditor’s length of service. Some of the elements in this dimension are covered through the 
disclosures prescribed in the Accounting Act §3-3b, such as the composition of the board and 
information regarding the instructions for the audit committee and auditor.  
The distribution of companies’ total scores is shown in Figure 10. Of the reviewed companies, 
the highest total transparency score was 69% and was achieved by three companies (12%). 
The lowest total transparency score in this category was 25% and was achieved by two 
companies (8%). Both the average and median score was 50%, resulting from the fact that all 
companies achieving a full score on at least two indicators. 
The distribution of scores on the individual Governance indicators is shown in Figure 11. It 
shows that all companies provided information on number of board members (one company 
revealed this through the board’s signature, achieving a 1-point score on this indicator). Two 
companies (8%) failed to provide information on gender balance in the board (this could be 
derived from the names of the board members stated on the signature page of the annual 
report, but because names cannot always provide 100% certainty on the gender, it was not 
used for scoring on this indicator). Only one report (4%) failed to disclose details on auditor 
remuneration. Disclosure on the above indicators are specifically required by the Accounting 
Act. 
The distribution of scores on the indicators not specifically mentioned in the Accounting Act 
showed the following result. No company specifically disclosed average length of service or 
average age of board members, but in some cases this information was possible to derive from 
the presentation of the board members, gaining the companies a 1-point score. 3 reports 
disclosed information on board meeting attendance, and 3 reports disclosed information on 
the auditor’s length of service. It must be noted, though, that auditor’s length of service was 
only provided in cases were the auditor was replaced in the last year. 
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Figure	10	Distribution	of	companies'	total	scores	on	the	Governance	indicators	
 
Figure	11	Distribution	of	scores	on	each	of	the	Governance	indicators	
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6.4	Labor	
The dimension called Labor captured information on employees and employee rights. 
Specifically, it included indicators on gender balance, share of employees that are not 
permanent (contractors, seasonal or temporary), share that belong to a trade union, employees 
trained, employee turnover, sickness leave and strike action. Disclosure on gender balance 
and sickness leave is required by Accounting Act §3-3a, while disclosure on trade union 
membership, training, turnover, strike action is not. It was therefore expected that only the 
latter indicators would be lacking from some of the reports. 
The distribution of companies’ total scores is shown in Figure 12. The results show a span in 
scores from the lowest – 9% transparency score – to the highest – 59% transparency score. 
The average transparency score was 35%, and the median score was 36%. By eliminating the 
two least and the two most transparent reports, we get an average score of 35%, with a span 
from 27% to 45%, indicating little variability between the reports. 
The distribution of scores on the individual Labor indicators is shown in Figure 13. The 
indicators specifically mentioned in the Accounting Act saw the highest overall scores. All 
companies disclosed the total number of employees at year end (question 1), and many also 
disclosed total person hours worked (72% on question 7). 23 companies (92%) disclosed the 
employee gender balance (question 3), and 20 companies (80%) disclosed total sickness leave 
in either percent of full-time equivalents or in days (question 10).  
Of the indicators not mentioned in the Accounting Act or not used in subsequent calculations 
(such as total person hours worked), few companies gained a full 2-point transparency score. 
The indicator with highest share of transparent disclosures in this category, was question 2 on 
the number of temporary employees, which was disclosed by 4 companies (16%). 3 (12%) or 
less companies disclosed information on the other indicators not mentioned in the Accounting 
Act.  
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Figure	12	Distribution	of	companies'	total	scores	in	the	Labor	category	indicators	
 
Figure	13	Distribution	of	score	on	the	individual	Labor	indicators	
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6.5	Health	and	Safety	
This dimension captured information on the employees’ health and safety. It covers indicators 
on accidents leading to injuries and fatalities as well as injury frequency rate and the 
frequency rate goals of the company. The Accounting Act §3-3a requires all large companies 
to disclose information on accidents and injuries. 
The distribution of companies’ total scores in the Health and Safety category is shown in 
Figure 14. The distribution shows that 7 companies (28%) failed to disclose any quantitative 
information on the indicators in this category. Two companies (8%) achieved a 100% 
transparency score. The average transparency score was 35% and the median was 33%. With 
a spread in scores from 0% to 100%, this category saw a significantly larger variability than 
in example the Labor category (see Figure 12). 
The distribution of scores on the individual Health and Safety indicators is shown in Figure 
15. Questions 1 through 5 are all partly covering the requirement in the Accounting Act § 3-
3a, meaning failure to disclose such information results in being incompliant with the law. 
The companies showed variance in how they reported accidents and injuries, resulting in 
variable scores on the 5 questions. 15 companies (60%) disclosed information on number of 
lost time injuries, which was the indicator with highest rate of disclosure. Between 4 and 7 
companies (16-28%) disclosed information on injury frequency rates. 
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Figure	14	Distribution	of	companies'	total	score	on	the	Health	and	Safety	indicators.	
 
Figure	15	Distribution	of	scores	on	the	individual	indicators	in	the	Health	and	Safety	category.	
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6.6	Environment	
The environmental dimension captured disclosures on energy usage, emissions of CO2 
equivalents, water usage, and disposal and recycling of waste. The Accounting Act §3-3a 
requires the disclosure of how the company’s input factors or products may negatively affect 
the environment and what measures are taken or planned to hinder this. Accounting Act §3-3c 
requires companies to give an account of their guidelines, actions and results for minimizing 
harm to the environment. 
The distribution of companies’ total scores on the Environmental indicators is shown in 
Figure 16. 20 companies (80%) did not disclose any quantitative information on any 
indicators in the index, resulting in a 0% transparency score. 5 companies did disclose 
information on at least one of the indicators, achieving between 6% and 97% transparency 
score. Only two companies achieved a higher transparency score than 25%. The average 
transparency score was 9%, and the median score 0%. 
The distribution of scores on the individual Environmental indicators is shown in Figure 17. 
The indicator with the highest disclosure rate was the indicator for total emissions of CO2 
equivalents, which 4 companies (16%) disclosed information on. The two most transparent 
reporters disclosed information on the majority of the indicators, resulting in all indicators 
receiving a disclosure rate of between 4% and 16%.   
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Figure	16	Distribution	of	companies'	total	scores	on	the	indicators	in	the	Environment	category	
Figure	17	Distribution	of	scores	on	the	individual	indicators	in	the	Environment	category.	
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7	DISCUSSION	
This chapter is dedicated to the discussion of the findings and their importance, and will 
provide a nuanced answer to the research question. First I will analyze the findings and 
discuss potential reasons for the variance in the findings. Then, I discuss the possible 
relationship between how specific the law is and corporate disclosure. Subsequently, I will 
discuss the two most transparent reporters and contrast them to the two least transparent 
reporters. Next, I will discuss the limitations of this study and make suggestions for further 
research. Finally, I will summarize the findings and conclude. 
7.1	Analysis	of	Findings	
The average transparency score for all the reviewed companies was 28%, meaning that the 
companies only disclosed quantitative and comparable information on less than 1/3 of the 
indicators measured in this study. The category with the highest average transparency score 
was Governance, while Environment had the lowest average score. The indicators all captured 
quantitative information it is reasonable to expect large and well-governed companies to have 
and disclose, but not all this information is specifically required in the Accounting Act. 
Assuming that the transparency index used in this study is an adequate measure for 
transparency, the short answer to the research question is that Norwegian companies have 
significant room for improvement on transparency. 
7.1.1	Transparency	on	Governance	versus	Environment	Indicators	
The amendment to the Accounting Act in 2013 requires more non-financial disclosure than 
before. Several aspects covered in this study was already present in the Accounting Act 
before the amendment from 2013, including disclosure on corporate governance and 
environmental issues. In example, elements of environmental disclosure was added to the 
Accounting Act as early as 1977, and regulation on environmental disclosure was further 
tightened in 1998 (Vormedal & Ruud, 2009). Therefore, disclosure on governance and 
environmental issues should not be considered new for most companies in Norway. Still, 
disclosure on environmental issues have been largely ignored by Norwegian companies, with 
only 10% of companies found to report “satisfactory” in accordance to the Accounting Act in 
2009 (Vormedal & Ruud, 2009). Disclosure on Governance have also been found to be 
“unsatisfactory” compared to the guidelines from The Norwegian Corporate Governance 
Board (NUES) (EY, 2015). 
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Issues regarding corporate governance are mentioned in the Accounting Act § 3-3b, and 
specifically requires the disclosure on the composition of the board and information regarding 
the instructions for the audit committee and auditor. For the requirements on company 
impacts on the environment, this is mentioned both in § 3-3a and § 3-3c. The main difference 
in the requirements for the two issues, is that environmental disclosure requirements seem 
much more general than the specific requirements for some elements of corporate 
governance. With this background, I expected lower transparency scores on the Environment 
indicators than Governance indicators.  
It was not surprising to find exceptionally low overall transparency rate on the Environment 
category compared to the Governance category. 80% of the sample failed to provide any 
quantitative results or performance measures on environmental indicators in their annual 
report. On the Governance indicators, the lowest overall transparency score was 25%. My 
findings largely indicate a low overall transparency, especially on environmental disclosure. 
This supports the earlier research by Vormedal and Ruud (2009) and Olsen and Orderdalen 
(2014). The variability of transparency scores on Governance indicators seem to be in line 
with the general conclusions by EY (2015). Despite this result being expected, it is still 
signifying an alarming low compliance rate on environmental issues.  
7.1.2	Further	Analysis	of	Disclosure	of	Environmental	Information	
What did the 20 companies with a 0% transparency score say about their environmental 
impact in their annual reports? 
Even though few companies included quantitative data on environmental performance, 
virtually all included statements or claims regarding their environmental footprints. The 
annual reports of the firms with lowest transparent on environmental issues only included 
information on their environmental policies and internal reporting standards, while excluded 
performance measures and results (see examples in Box 1 below). In addition, some reports 
simply stated that the company do not materially affect the environment (see examples in Box 
2 below).  
The general lack of quantitative performance data in most reports is in stark contrast to the 
most transparent reporter’s detailed energy and climate report (see Figure 18). This energy 
and climate report includes breakdown on energy sources and scope 1-3 emissions for its total 
operations. 
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Box 1: Examples of internal environmental 
policies mentioned in the annual reports. 
“In	2012	the	group	was	certified	
according	to	the	ISO-14001	standard	
and	is	audited	annually	by	
classification	companies.	Specific	
plans	to	minimise	emissions	are	in	
place	and	the	group	follows	up	on	
adverse	impacts	on	the	environment	
through	defined	KPIs.	Furthermore,	a	
new	environmental	programme	has	
been	developed	to	monitor	emission	
into	the	air.”	(GC	Rieber	Shipping	ASA,	
2015,	page	21)	
“Several	of	the	group’s	manufacturing	
units	are	certified	in	accordance	with	
the	NS	ISO	14000	series	of	
environmental	management	
standards.”	(Kitron	ASA,	2015,	page	
83)	
 
Box 2: Examples of statements of not materially affecting 
the environment found in the annual reports. 
“The	Board	is	of	the	opinion	that	the	bank’s	
operations	are	not	affecting	the	natural	
environment	in	excess	of	what	is	normal	for	office	
operations.”	(Verdibanken	ASA,	2015,	page	3,	
author’s	translation)	
	“Kitron	does	not	pollute	the	external	environment	
to	any	material	extent.	(Kitron	ASA,	2015,	page	7)	
“GC	Rieber	Shipping	operates	in	compliance	with	
international	shipping	standards	for	emission	into	
the	sea	and	air	and	works	proactively	to	comply	with	
existing	and	new	environmental	regulations.”	(GC	
Rieber	Shipping,	2015,	page	37	
“We	aim	to	be	as	environment-friendly	as	possible.	
Our	core	business	and	production	does	not	affect	the	
natural	environment.	Nevertheless,	we	have	put	a	
number	of	measures	in	place	to	prevent	our	
activities	having	unfortunate	environmental	side-
effects.”	(Bouvet	ASA,	2015)	
Figure 18 Energy and Climate Account from Storebrand ASA's annual report for 2014 
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7.1.3	Standard	Disclosures,	Labor,	and	Health	and	Safety	Indicators	
Many companies in the sample was given a 0% transparency score on the Standard 
Disclosures category. First of all, it means that report does not use the most common 
international non-financial reporting framework (question 1), which is the Global Reporting 
Initiative’s Reporting Guidelines. Secondly, it means that the report is not assured (question 
2) and that the information that is disclosed is not verified to be measured and presented 
correctly. Thirdly, it means that the auditor (assuming now that the report was assured) did 
not provide information on what measurement processes or results were verified (question 3). 
Finally, it means that the company was not a signatory to the United Nations Global Compact. 
In sum, a 0% score on the Standard Disclosures category means that the non-
financial/sustainability report is not granted the same level of quality, assurance and 
comparability that the stakeholders as has become to expect from financial disclosure. 
The findings showed that 15 of the 25 companies had their auditor assure their non-financial 
reports. This means that many companies make efforts to verify its claims on non-financial 
reporting, thus potentially increasing the face value of the information in the reports to the 
companies’ stakeholders. Still, very few companies used the international reporting standard 
GRI, even though this standard is both mentioned in the Accounting Act § 3-3c section three 
and recommended by the UN Global Compact (United Nations Global Compact, 2014). The 
consequence of not using a common reporting standard is that the companies’ performance 
might not be comparable for the readers of the annual reports. 
Disclosure on gender balance and sickness leave is required by Accounting Act §3-3a, while 
disclosure on trade union membership, training, turnover, strike action is not. It was therefore 
expected that only the latter indicators would be lacking from some of the reports. The 
findings showed this expectation to generally hold, but some companies failed to disclose 
information on these indicators. This meant that at least 20% of the reviewed companies were 
incompliant with the labor disclosure requirements in the Accounting Act. 
The Accounting Act §3-3a also requires large companies to disclose information on accidents 
and injuries, but does not specify the level of detail. It was therefore expected that companies 
showed lower transparency on the indicators specifying whether the injury led to lost time or 
not, specifying injury frequency rate and rate target. The findings showed that companies 
varied in how detailed they reported on accidents, and several firms reported with a single 
sentence declaring that they did not have any injuries in the accounting year. 
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7.2	What	is	the	Relationship	Between	Regulation	Specificity	and	Transparency?	
The difference in transparency between governance and environmental indicators is striking. 
It is worth noting however that several of the governance indicators used in this study are 
specifically required by the Accounting Act, such as the composition of the board and 
information about the auditor (See Accounting Act § 3-3 b). This naturally resulted in a high 
transparency score on the indicators asking for number of members and gender balance of the 
board, as well as details on payments to the auditor. Other governance indicators, such as 
attendance at board meetings and length of service for board members and auditor, saw very 
low rate of disclosure.  
When comparing governance indicators to the environmental indicators, and knowing that 
there are no corresponding requirements for specific environmental information in the 
Accounting Act (see discussion in chapter 7.1.1), it was no surprise that most companies (4/5) 
had a 0% environmental transparency rate. On the other hand, 1/5 of the companies did 
disclose information on some or all of the environmental indicators. These companies 
averaged a 43% environmental transparency score. 
Disclosure on labor indicators were also relatively high, and mediocre on health and safety 
indicators. Both saw higher transparency rate on the indicators specifically mentioned in the 
Accounting Act. Disclosure on gender balance, sickness leave, accidents and injuries are all 
specifically required by Accounting Act §3-3a, while disclosure on trade union membership, 
training, turnover, strike action, accident frequency rate is not. 
These findings may suggest that the specificity of the law plays an important role in 
transparent reporting, and may also suggest that companies tend to minimize information 
disclosure. There is still need for knowledge on the drivers for corporate disclosure. This 
could bring insights into the effectiveness of regulatory tools, understanding if companies try 
to minimize information disclosure, and discerning potential reasons for this.  
7.3	The	Most/Least	Transparent	Companies	
The most transparent reporter in this study was Storebrand with an overall score of 60%. 
Despite achieving the highest overall score, Storebrand got a 0% transparency score on Health 
and Safety indicators. This may be related to their line of business – finance/insurance. 
Another firm in the same industry – Gjensidige Forsikring – had a very similar approach to 
health and safety disclosure as Storebrand. Gjensidige Forsikring achieved a 61% 
transparency score on health and safety simply by stating that they did not have any injuries at 
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all in the reporting period. It could be argued that the scoring rules for health and safety could 
be changed to reflect this issue. Gjensidige Forsikring was awarded full score on the related 
indicators for disclosing all accidents for the year (0), but they did not specify that this meant 
0 fatalities, first-aid, medical, and lost-time cases. They scored less than 100% for not 
including information on accident frequency rates and rate targets. Using the current scoring 
rules, and on the assumption that Storebrand did not have any injuries, they could have 
achieved a similar 61% transparency score on health and safety by stating that there were no 
accidents or injuries. This illustrates some of the limitations of employing a quantitative 
measure of transparency. 
Figure	19	Comparison	of	overall	transparency	scores	for	the	two	most/least	transparent	firms	in	the	sample	
 
Storebrand was also the only firm to perform detailed energy and climate accounting (see 
Figure 18 above), with energy use, Scope 1-3 emissions assessment, water usage, and waste 
produced (see figure below). Other firms like the second most transparent reporter Petroleum 
Geo-Services also included much of this information (59% environmental transparency 
score), but Storebrand was alone in providing transparent information on almost all the 
environmental indicators in this study. 
Petroleum Geo-Services (PGS) was the second most transparent reporter achieving an overall 
transparency score of 56%. PGS scored lower on indicators on standards and environment 
than Storebrand. The score on standards was lower for PGS than Storebrand due to PGS not 
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being GRI-compliant, not stating being a signatory to the UN Global Compact (UNGC) 
prinicples, and that their assurance report did not include information on what factors were 
checked by the auditor. The lower score on environmental indicators were due to not stating 
any reduction targets (energy, emissions, water), and by not disclosing water usage and 
amount of hazardous waste created and disposed in the reporting year. 
The two least transparent reporters Europris and Statoil Kapitalforvaltning, dueling for the 
last position with both achieving an overall score of 13%. Neither company disclosed 
information on the environmental indicators. They also scored 0% on standards, meaning that 
they are not signatories to the UNGC or GRI-compliant, which would require more disclosure 
on environmental issues. Statoil Kapitalforvaltning scored 0% on the health and safety 
indicators, and Europris only achieved full score on one of these indicators (for a full score 
chart for all companies in the sample, see Appendix III).  
It would not be very surprising to find few injuries in the finance and wholesale industries, 
given the low use of manual labor and low risk of serious accidents in these industries. Given 
that the Accounting Act § 3-3a specifically requires companies to disclose information on 
injuries, it is surprising that many firms chose to not even mention this. The two least 
transparent firms scored highest on governance and labor indicators. As discussed above, 
relatively high scores on these two categories were expected due to the specific requirements 
in the Accounting Act. 
7.4	Limitations	and	Suggestions	for	Further	Research	
Because the aim of this study was to reveal the status quo on transparency in corporate non-
financial disclosure, a quantitative measure was chosen. This approach is practical in the 
sense that it gives a good overview of what issues corporations disclose actual performance. 
On the other hand, limiting the study only to a quantitative one-dimensional measure will 
eventually lead to overlooking useful qualitative non-financial information. One can argue 
that performance can not always be measured quantitatively, and certain researchers find it 
difficult to find valid performance measures for sustainability issues (Margolis & Walsh, 
2001). Further research could therefore be done using multi-dimensional measures for 
transparency. One example could be to use the rate of disclosure of negative performance 
information (compared to the rate of disclosing positive information) as another dimension in 
measuring transparency. Another possibility is to use other assessment frameworks and 
datasets such as the GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, Bloomberg ESG database, or 
UN Global Compact Progress Reports. 
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Another limitation of only capturing quantitative data was highlighted in the discussion in 
chapter 7.3. Some companies scored higher on certain transparency indicators simply by 
including a simple statement of no accidents (for health and safety indicators). The two 
companies mentioned above both likely had 0 accidents and injuries, but one of them failed to 
mention this. On the other hand, as a measure for transparency, this scoring was correct. Most 
importantly. what this limitation underlines, is that there might be a performance-disclosure 
gap. This gap is not captured by this study’s approach, as this study only uses self-reported 
data. More knowledge is needed on the relation between corporate transparency and actual 
performance in Norway. 
A third limitation is in the possibility to generalize the findings to other regions, industries or 
company types. This study analyses a sample of a wide range of companies in a Norwegian 
context. This means that the companies are affected by the legal and social context in 
Norway, making new research in other countries necessary in order to compare the results 
across regions. Not being able to distinguish trends in specific industries is a factor of the 
choice of sample. The sample was chosen to represent the Norwegian market, and not to 
differentiate between industries. There is still need for knowledge on transparency in different 
industries, and the drivers for corporate disclosure in these industries. 
7.5	Conclusions	
The research question for this master thesis was “How transparent are Norwegian companies 
about their CSR performance in the annual reports for the accounting year 2014”. This 
research question was further operationalized into: “How much quantitative and easily 
comparable information is publically disclosed by Norwegian companies about their 
corporate governance, labor conditions, health and safety, and environmental impact?” 
As the operationalized research question reveals, this study was limited to analyzing 
quantitative performance data found in public annual reports. The study found that Norwegian 
corporate non-financial disclosure is generally low in transparency. The reporters achieved 
the highest transparency score on governance indicators and the lowest transparency score on 
environmental indicators. The analysis of the findings suggests that the specificity of the 
requirements in the Accounting Act may be related to the variance in transparency on the 
different issues measured. The study also suggests that more knowledge is needed on the 
drivers for corporate disclosure and the effect of regulators’ tools on corporate performance. 
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8	SUMMARY	
The world’s climate is changing, and companies around the world are irreversibly impacting 
societies and the environment. Regulators are increasingly turning to non-financial disclosure 
regulations as a tool to increase corporate transparency about social and environmental issues. 
The goal is to make companies accountable for their impact on their environment and to 
incentivize better corporate social and environmental performance. To achieve this, 
stakeholders need information on how well corporations perform on these issues. This study 
is aimed at finding out how transparent corporations are in disclosing quantitative 
performance measures. This is done in a Norwegian context, drawing a sample of companies 
affected by the 2013 amendment to the Norwegian Accounting Act. The amendment added 
requirements for non-financial disclosure for large companies in Norway. This study used a 
transparency framework to assess the transparency of annual reports from 2014. This revealed 
a varying degree of transparency on the different categories in the framework. Most 
importantly, this study found that transparency on environmental issues is alarmingly low. 
Secondly, it found that the specificity of the Accounting Act may play a role in the variability 
of transparency across different issues. Therefore, there is a need for more knowledge on how 
the regulators’ tools are affecting performance. 
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Appendix	
Appendix	I:	Transparency	Indicators	Used	in	the	Study	
Standards	and	Assurance	Indicators	
1. Do	the	report	claim	GRI-compliance?	
2. Has	the	sustainability	report	been	assured	by	a	third-party?	
3. Has	the	assurance	provider	given	information	on	tests	on	specific	data	points	and	provided	insightful	findings	in	the	assurance	report?	
4. Is	the	company	a	signatory	of	the	United	Nations	Global	Compact?	
Corporate	Governance	Indicators	
1. Number	of	board	members	
2. Gender	balance	in	the	board	
3. Average	length	of	service	for	board	members	
4. Average	age	of	board	members	
5. Average	attendance	at	board	and	committee	meetings	
6. Auditor	remuneration:	audit	fees,	non-audit	fees,	and	other	services	
7. Auditor	length	of	service	
8. Number	of	members	of	management	team	
Labor	indicators	
1. Total	number	of	employees	(average	or	year-end)	
2. Number	of	temporary	employees	(contractors	or	seasonal)	
3. Gender	balance	of	employees	
4. Share	of	employees	who	are	permanent	
5. Share	of	employees	who	belong	to	a	Trade	Union	
6. Employee	Turnover	
7. Total	person	hours	worked,	or	average	full-time	equivalents	during	the	year.	
8. Total	number	of	employees	trained	
9. Cost	of	training	
10. Person	days	lost	due	to	sickness	leave	-	in	percent	or	days	
11. Person	days	lost	due	to	strike	or	other	industrial	action.	
Health	and	safety	indicators	
1. Number	of	fatalities	(i.e.	injuries	on	duty	leading	to	death)	
2. Number	of	first	aid	cases	(i.e.	injuries	on	duty	leading	to	minor	treatments,	such	as	plaster	or	pain	tablet)	
3. Number	of	medical	treatment	cases	(i.e.	injuries	on	duty	leading	to	medical	treatment	but	no	lost	days)	
4. Number	of	lost	time	injuries	(i.e.	injuries	on	duty	leading	to	at	least	one	lost	day)	
5. Total	number	of	recordable	injuries	
6. Fatal	injury	frequency	rate	(i.e.	per	200k,	1000k	hours	or	per	full-time	equivalents)	
7. Lost	time	injury	frequency	rate	(i.e.	per	200k,	1000k	hours	or	per	full-time	equivalents)	
8. Total	recordable	injury	frequency	rate	(i.e.	per	200k,	1000k	hours	or	per	full-time	equivalents)	
9. Does	the	company	report	injury	rate	targets?	
Environmental	indicators	
1. Total	direct	energy	consumption	-	Gigajoules	(i.e.	use	of	fuels)	
2. Total	indirect	energy	consumption	-	Gigajoules	(electricity	purchased)	
3. Total	electricity	consumption	(MWh)	
4. Target:	Reduction	in	electricity	intensity	
5. Target:	Reduction	in	energy	intensity	
6. Total	carbon	emissions	(tons	of	carbon	dioxide	equivalents,	CO2e)	
7. Total	Scope	1	CO2e	Emissions	–	Tons	
8. Total	Scope	2	CO2e	Emissions	–	Tons	
9. Total	Scope	3	CO2e	Emissions	–	Tons	
10. Target:	Reduction	in	Carbon	Emission	intensity	
11. Total	water	consumption	(kilolitres,	or	m3)	
12. Target:	Reduction	in	water	intensity	
13. Total	volume	of	non-hazardous	waste	disposed	(tons)	
14. Total	volume	of	hazardous	waste	disposed	(tons)	
15. Total	volume	of	waste	sent	for	recycling	(tons)	
16. Percentage	of	waste	disposed	that	is	sent	for	recycling	 	
Appendix	II:		
Summary	of	the	Sustainability	Data	Transparency	Index	
See	Rea,	M.	H.	(2015).	SDTI	2014.	Integrated	Reporting	&	Assurance	Services,	available	at	http://www.iras.co.za/Research/2014/IRAS%20-
%202014%20Research%20Report%20-%2029%20September%20-%20FINAL.pdf	
- 7	Standard	Disclosures	
o SD1	Is	the	report	GRI-compliant?	
o SD2	Has	the	report	been	assured?	
o SD3	Did	the	assurance	provider	test	specific	data	points	and	provide	insightful	findings?	
o SD4	Has	the	company	made	a	CDP	Submission?	
o SD5	Does	the	report	contain	a	King	III	compliance	checklist?	
o SD6	Is	the	company	a	signatory	of	the	United	Nations	Global	Compact	(UNGC)?	
o SD7	Is	the	company	a	signatory	of	any	Industry-specific	regulatory	body	(e.g.	ICMM)	or	the	Equator	Principles?	
- 12	Labor	indicators	
o La1:	Total	number	of	employees	
o La2:	Total	number	of	temporary	employees	(contractors,	seasonal,	casual,	temporary)	
o La3:	Percentage	of	employees	who	are	deemed	“HDSA”	
o La4:	Percentage	of	employees	who	are	women	
o La5:	Percentage	of	employees	who	are	“permanent”	
o La6:	Percentage	of	employees	who	belong	to	a	Trade	Union	
o La7:	Employee	Turnover	(i.e.	number	of	persons	who	departed	relative	to	the	total	number	of	employees	at	year-end	
o La8:	Total	number	of	Person	Hours	Worked	(PHW)	–	Reported	
o La9:	Total	number	of	employees	trained,	including	internal	and	external	training	interventions	
o La10:	Monetary	value	of	Employee	training	spend	
o La11:	Total	number	of	Person	Days	lost	due	to	absenteeism	
o La12:	Total	number	of	Person	Days	lost	due	to	industrial	action	(i.e.	strike	action)	
- 12	economic	indicators	
o Ec1:	Monetary	value	of	Total	Revenue	Generated	
o Ec2:	Monetary	value	of	Net	Profit	Generated	
o Ec3:	Monetary	value	of	Total	Compensation	Paid	to	Employees,	including	wages	and	benefits	
o Ec4:	Total	Monetary	value	of	Compensation	Paid	to	Executive	directors	–	excluding	LTIP	gains	
o Ec5:	Total	monetary	value	of	long-term	incentive	plan	(LTIP)	gains	–	executive	directors	
o Ec6:	Total	monetary	value	of	compensation	paid	to	prescribed	officers	–	excluding	LTIP	gains	
o Ec7:	total	monetary	value	of	LTIP	gains	–	prescribed	officers	
o Ec8:	monetary	value	of	historically	disadvantaged	South	African	Procurement	spend	(HDSA)	
o Ec9:	monetary	value	of	total	taxes	borne	and	collected	on	behalf	of	government(s),	inclusive	of	VAT,	income	tax,	royalties,	rates	&	
taxes,	etc.	
o Ec10:	monetary	value	of	funds	invested	in	research	and	development	
o Ec11:	monetary	value	of	dividends	paid	to	shareholders	
o Ec12:	monetary	value	of	earnings	retained	
- 10	CSI/SED	spend	indicators	
o CS1:	monetary	value	of	total	corporate	social	investment	(CSI)/socioeconomic	development	(SED)	expenditures	–	reported	
o CS2:	monetary	value	of	CSI/SED	spend	on	education	
o CS3:	monetary	value	of	CSI/SED	spend	on	skills	development	
o CS4:	monetary	value	of	CSI/SED	spend	on	health	
o CS5:	monetary	value	of	CSI/SED	spend	on	basic	needs	and	social	development,	including	nutrition	and/or	feeding	programmes	
o CS6:	monetary	value	of	CSI/SED	spend	on	infrastructure	development	
o CS7:	monetary	value	of	CSI/SED	spend	on	arts	and	culture	
o CS8:	monetary	value	of	CSI/SED	spend	on	other	
o CS9:	comprehensive	discussion	of	returns	on	CSI/SED	expenditures	
o CS10:	monetary	value	of	enterprise	development	spend	
- 10	environmental	indicators	
o En1:	total	direct	energy	consumption	(Gigajoules)	–	i.e.	from	fuels	burned	
o En2:	total	indirect	energy	consumption	(Gigajoules)	–	i.e.	from	electricity	purchased	
o En3:	total	electricity	consumption	(MWh)	
o En4:	total	carbon	emissions	(tons	of	carbon	dioxide	equivalents,	CO2e)	
o En5:	total	carbon	emissions	include	the	following	mix	(scopes	1	to	3)	
o En6:	total	water	consumption	(kilolitres,	or	m3)	
o En7:	total	volume	of	non-hazardous	waste	disposed	(tons)	
o En8:	total	volume	of	hazardous	waste	disposed	(tons)	
o En9:	total	volume	of	waste	sent	for	recycling	(tons)	
o En10:	percentage	of	waste	disposed	that	is	sent	for	recycling	-	reported	
- 11	health	and	safety	indicators	
o HS1:	number	of	fatalities	(i.e.	injuries	on	duty	leading	to	death)	
o HS2:	number	of	first	aid	cases	(FACs	i.e.	injuries	on	duty	leading	to	minor	treatments,	such	as	plaster	or	pain	tablet)	
o HS3:	number	of	medical	treatment	cases	(MTCs	i.e.	injuries	on	duty	leading	to	medical	treatment	but	no	lost	days)	
o HS4:	number	of	lost	time	injuries	(LTIs,	i.e.	injuries	on	duty	leading	to	at	least	one	lost	day)	
o HS5:	total	number	of	recordable	injuries,	including	MTCs,	LTIs	and	fatalities	
o HS6:	fatal	injury	frequency	rate	(i.e.	number	of	fatalities	per	200.000	hours	worked)	
o HS7:	lost	time	injury	frequence	rate	(number	of	LTIs	per	200.000	hours	worked)	
o HS8:	total	recordable	injury	frequency	rate	(i.e.	number	of	LTIs,	MTCs	and	fatalities	per	200.000	hours	worked)	
o HS9:	total	number	of	employees	and	contractor	receiving	voluntary	counselling	and	testing	(VCT)	for	HIV/AIDS	
o HS10:	total	number	of	employees	and	contractors	tested	for	HIV/AIDS	
o HS11:	HIV/AIDS	prevalence	rate	amongst	employees	
- 12	Governance	indicators	
o Gov1:	number	of	board	members	
o Gov2:	number	of	board	members	who	are	non-executive	
o Gov3:	number	of	board	members	who	are	deemed	“independent”	
o Gov4:	number	of	board	members	who	are	deemed	HDSA	
o Gov5:	number	of	board	members	who	are	women	
o Gov6:	average	length	of	service	–	executive	directors	
o Gov7:	average	length	of	service	–	non-executive	directors	
o Gov8:	average	length	of	service	-	overall	
o Gov9:	average	age	of	directors	
o Gov10:	average	attendance	at	board	and	committee	meetings	
o Gov	11:	auditor	remuneration:	percentage	of	non-audit	fees/fees	for	other	services	
o Gov12:	number	of	prescribed	officers	
	
	 	
Appendix	III:	Data	Sheet
ID
# S1 S2 S3 S4 Gov1 Gov2 Gov3 Gov4 Gov5 Gov6 Gov7 Gov8
2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 2 0 2
3 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 2 2 2
4 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0
6 0 2 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 2 0 2
7 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 2
8 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 2
9 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0
10 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 2
11 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 2 0 2
12 2 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 0
13 0 2 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 2
14 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 2 0 2
15 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 2
16 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 2 0 2
17 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 2
18 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
19 0 2 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 2 2 2
20 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 2
21 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 0 2
23 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0
24 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 2
25 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 2
27 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
28 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 2
Standard	Disclosures Governance	Indicators
Gov8 #2 Gov9 La2 La3 La4 La5 La6 La7 La8 La9 La10 La11
2 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
2 3 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 0
0 4 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
2 6 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
2 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 8 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
0 9 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
2 10 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
2 11 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0
0 12 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 2 0 2 0
2 13 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
2 14 2 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 0
2 15 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
2 16 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
2 17 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
2 18 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 19 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0
2 20 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
0 21 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
2 22 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
0 23 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
2 24 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
2 25 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
0 27 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
2 28 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Governance	Indicators Labour	Indicators
	
La11 #2 HS1 HS2 HS3 HS4 HS5 HS6 HS7 HS8 HS9
0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0
0 4 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0
0 7 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 10 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0 11 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 0
0 12 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 2
0 13 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
0 14 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0 15 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
0 16 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
0 17 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
0 19 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0
0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 23 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
0 24 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0
0 25 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 28 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
Health	&	Safety	Indicators
	
HS9 #2 En1 En2 En3 En4 En5 En6 En7 En8 En9 En10 En11 En12 En13 En14 En15 En16
0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 11 0 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 14 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 19 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 1
0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
0 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Health	&	Safety	Indicators Environmental	Indicators
En16 #2 Standard	DisclosuresGovernance Health	and	Safety Environment Overall	Score
0 2 0	% 56	% 0	% 0	% 16	%
0 3 25	% 69	% 78	% 0	% 40	%
0 4 25	% 38	% 44	% 0	% 25	%
0 6 25	% 56	% 22	% 0	% 22	%
0 7 0	% 50	% 11	% 0	% 13	%
0 8 0	% 50	% 0	% 0	% 17	%
0 9 0	% 38	% 0	% 0	% 15	%
0 10 25	% 63	% 100	% 0	% 41	%
0 11 25	% 56	% 61	% 25	% 42	%
0 12 75	% 50	% 33	% 6	% 36	%
0 13 50	% 38	% 22	% 0	% 23	%
0 14 25	% 56	% 100	% 25	% 49	%
0 15 0	% 50	% 56	% 0	% 27	%
0 16 25	% 56	% 11	% 0	% 22	%
0 17 25	% 50	% 33	% 0	% 25	%
0 18 50	% 38	% 11	% 0	% 17	%
1 19 25	% 69	% 78	% 59	% 56	%
0 20 25	% 50	% 0	% 0	% 17	%
0 21 0	% 25	% 0	% 0	% 13	%
1 22 100	% 69	% 0	% 97	% 60	%
0 23 0	% 38	% 56	% 0	% 23	%
0 24 0	% 50	% 50	% 0	% 24	%
0 25 0	% 50	% 56	% 0	% 27	%
0 27 25	% 25	% 0	% 0	% 15	%
0 28 0	% 50	% 56	% 0	% 27	%
Overall	ScoresEnvironmental	Indicators
	
